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In this thesis we study the interdependency of individual decisions on work
and family, particularly the dynamic interaction of the marriage market and the labor
market. My basic idea is that marital status affects individual labor supply decisions,
and in turn, labor market condition influences marriage formation and dissolution.
While these interactions are evident, the overwhelming majority of research on labor
or family economics usually simplifies the individual decision-making by assuming
that one of two markets outcomes is given while studying the other one. In the
empirical study, endogeneity issues are troublesome, especially under the dynamic
setting.
My work takes a different approach. I directly model the individual decision-
making, which describes how marriage market and labor market interact with each
other; and matching with survey data we empirically recover the underlying economic
environments that characterize the structure of the marriage market and the labor
market. I further examine to what extent my model explains the observed facts. Very
few studies have been conducted to explore work and family issues in this direction
partly due to its complexity. The structural models, besides the conventional regres-
sion, improve our perceptions on how individuals form decisions on work and family,
vii
which have far-reaching implications on policy designs and welfare evaluations. In
my thesis, I explore all these issues in three steps.
In chapter 1, I explains a stylized fact that there exists a positive correlation
between rising wage inequality and declining marriage rates. A two-sided matching
model is developed to exploit a theoretical channel through which wage inequality
affects marriage rates. My model features a steady state equilibrium in which the
whole marriage market is divided into groups and only people in the same group
will marry each other. Using the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS)
data from 1970 to 2000, my estimates indicate that a structural change occurs in
the U.S. marriage market. The higher matching efficiency and declining elasticity
of men suggest that the nowadays marriage market provides more chance to meet
and better gender equity, though higher arrival rates also raise the outside options of
getting married. Additionally, I find that wage inequality accounts for over 38% of
the decline in marriage rate, which is underestimated in Gould (2003).
Chapter 2 examines household dynamic labor supply after introducing bargain-
ing between husbands and wives, which has not been thoroughly studied previously
in literature. Here bargaining between husbands and wives determines the amount
of husbands’ earnings that are transferred to wives for their private consumption. A
household search model that incorporates the intrahousehold bargaining is developed
and estimated using panel data from the year 2001 Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP). My results show that the portion of household income shared
by husbands for private consumption is responsive to their employment status, sug-
gesting the existence of the bargaining between the U.S. couples. My findings also
imply that the labor supply of women will increase with higher women wage and
lower money transfer from husbands to wives, showing that the income effect domi-
nates for wives. Moreover, the wage frontier of husbands is positively correlated with
wives’ wages and negatively correlated with husbands’ earnings transferred to wives,
viii
highlighting that husbands are subject to both the income effect and intra-household
bargaining, and their decisions depend on which effect dominates.
In the third and the last chapter, I study household unemployment duration.
Previously, most studies have addressed the topic of job search at the individual
level. This chapter studies job search patterns of married couples and in particular
compares couple’s unemployment duration given their spousal earnings. A household
search model is introduced, which includes the bargaining between husbands and
wives. I use the year 2001 panel data Survey of Income and Program Participation
(SIPP) to estimate the structural model of family decisions. Our findings reveal
that there exists a gender asymmetry in job search of the U.S. household: The more
husbands earn, the longer wives search for a job; but the more wives earn, the sooner
husbands find a job.
ix
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Chapter 1
Money and Marriage: Implications of Wage
Inequality on Marriage Outcomes
1.1 Introduction
Increasing wage inequality and declining marriage rate are well observed within
U.S. in the past decades. Recent studies by Bergstrom and Schoeni (1996), Bergstrom
and Bagnoli (1993), Blau, Kahn and Waldfogel (2000), Burdett and Coles (1999)
have drawn our attention to the connection between the labor market performance
and individual marital decisions.
Ferna´ndez, Guner and Knowles (2005), Fernndez and Rogerson (2001) both
mentioned the connection of sorting with inequality. Greenwood, Guner, and Knowles
(2003), Hewitt, Western, and Baxter (2002) discussed the relationship between mar-
riage and income distribution, and their emphasis were on how marriage affects in-
come distribution. However, the relationship between wage inequality and marriage
is comparatively less studied.
Loughran (2002) empirically estimates found that increasing within-group
male wage inequality, raises the expected value of continued marital search, and
so lowers female marriage propensities. Gould and Parserman (2003) further showed
that there exists a causal link between increasing wage inequality and declining mar-
riage rates, and increasing male inequality amounts to around 30% of the decline in
female marriage rate, after controlling for city effects and city-specific time trends.
Our question is, how does wage inequality affect marriage outcomes? Further,
empirically how much of the decline in marriage rates is accounted for by increasing
1
wage inequality?
The two goals of this chapter are (1) to theoretically study how wage inequality
affects marriage decisions , and (2) to empirically estimate the implication of wage
inequality on marriage outcomes. Note that the difficulty in empirical study lies in
that declining marriage rates are accompanied with increasing wage inequality across
time. It is not straightforward to identify the time trend of marriage market from
other time trends. So in the second part of this chapter we recover the efficiency
and elasticity of matching function that characterize the economic environments of
marriage market across time.
Part 1: Theoretical contribution
To answer the first question, we study the interdependency between wage
earnings and marriage formation in a stationary equilibrium. A two-sided matching
model is employed. This work is the first to build up a structural model to link
marriage outcomes with labor market performance such as wage inequality. It also
provides a theoretical support of how marriage choice is made conditional on the
level of wage inequality. This model features a steady state equilibrium in which the
whole marriage market is divided into distinct classes and individuals are grouped by
class: people not only choose whom to marry, but also are pre-determined whom they
are able to meet with by their characteristics, for example, wage rates. Individuals
search for partners by class, since only those in the same class meet each other and
get married.
Wage inequality, under this setting, affects marriage decisions. We take wage
as an approximation of individual characteristics, so its inequality represents the pool
distribution of potential partners. Wage inequality therefore influences the formation
of classes and the individual reservation values of getting married. For example, a
mean-preserving spread of wage distribution raises the portion of population falling
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above the former reservation value of the middle class, so in equilibrium pushes their
reservation values up. Higher reservation value will lead to the delay in marriage.
Our theory predicts that increasing wage inequality generates more classes in the
marriage market with smaller sizes, and then changes the population falling in each
class. So even without the changes in reservation values, the disproportional single
population of men and women in each class will cause the mismatch.
We adopt the matching function in the form of super-modularity to guaran-
tee the positive assortative matching as in Shimer and Smith(2000). Class defined
in this chapter is the population falling between a unique set of wage brackets. All
the distinct classes together cover the whole marriage market. The lower bound of
each class is the reservation value so that people propose only if the candidates are
above their reservation values. The upper bound portrays the best partner candidates
that are willing to accept those people in each class. The upper bound is endoge-
nously generated. In the steady state, once the reservation functions are derived from
equilibrium, marriage rates as outcomes of aggregate marital choices are determined.
With numerical simulation and analysis our model have two predictions on marriage
outcomes.
First, the effect of structural change of the U.S. marriage market is bi-directional:
higher arrival rates for both genders provide more opportunity to meet and increase
probability of being married; meanwhile, higher arrival rates raise the outside option
of getting married. Since people are more selective, rising outside options will lower
marriage rates. The outcomes of the two-directional effects are mixed and depend on
which effect dominates.
Second, as to the effect of wage inequality on marriage rate, our simulation
shows that (a) wage inequality generates more classes within marriage market and
itself will lead to the delay in marriage. When inequalities of both genders do not
grow in the same pace, it leads to the mismatch in marriage market, and lowers
3
marriage rates since in two-sided matching, either side could deny and wait; (b)
marriage is likely to be delayed by the above median to high-earning women in the
current marriage market. They tend to be more selective and prefer waiting longer
to marrying below their economic strata.
Part 2: Empirical Implementation
To empirically estimate the implication of wage inequality, we have to isolate
wage inequality from structural change of marriage market at MSA level. The avail-
able survey data provide insufficient information to identify and quantify the change
of marriage market structure since this change is hard to observe and measure.
The advantage of our model is, by matching data from year 1970, 1980, 1990
and 2000 1% public-use micro-sample of the U.S Decennial Census (IPUMS), we
recover the parameters of market structure by decade. Therefore, the time trend of
marriage market is replicable at the MSA level. In particular, we look at two key
parameters of the matching function – matching efficiency and elasticity of men. With
the recovered environments, we are able to decompose the decline of marriage rate.
Our decomposition reveals that, wage inequality amounts to more than 38%
of the decline of marriage rate. This effect was underestimated in Gould (2002), since
the effect of MSA-specific matching efficiency is not isolated.
Our main empirical findings of the recovered market structure are as followed.
Higher matching efficiency suggests that marriage market is getting more efficient
across decades, and the declining elasticity of men over women portrays nowadays a
more equal market for women. The two trends of rising mating efficiency and increas-
ing favor-women elasticity are rarely discussed or empirically tested in literature. We
view these trends as the outcomes of more women receiving higher education, more
women participating in labor force and the improvement of gender equity. These
two benefits, however, are eclipsed by their side effect of raising the outside option
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of both genders as well as rising wage inequality. The observed correlation between
wage inequality and single ratios is the outcomes of two-directional forces.
Additionally, we test the hypothesis that the sum of elasticity of men and
women equals one. The test indicates that the null hypothesis is not rejected, which
justifies our assumption of constant return of elasticity in estimating model.
The reminder of this chapter proceeds as follows. In section 2, a two-sided
matching model is constructed to capture the formation of marriage, and the existence
of equilibrium is proved. Numerical analysis is made of equilibrium properties with
simulation methods in section 3. In section 4, we describe the IPUMS data and
empirical estimation is displayed. Section 5 presents the implication of estimated
results. Finally, we make conclusion in section 6.
1.2 Two-Sided Matching Model
In this section, we formulate a structural model of how marriage is formed
under bilateral agreement. Then we impose conditions that guarantee the existence of
a steady state equilibrium, and the properties of equilibrium are then presented. The
positive assortative mating and two-sided matching induce a steady state equilibrium
in which multiple classes coexist and people marry by class.
1.2.1 Model
Environment In our economy, time is discrete and discounted at the rate β.
Two types of agents – men m and women w – are infinite lived. Assume that agents
are ex ante heterogeneous and characterized in two dimensions: their economic strata,
which is approximated by their wage w, and marital status as either married m or
single s. Only single people are actively searching for partners.
5
Preferences Assume that traits of individuals are described by their wages.
The singles have utility u(w) = w, where u(·) is the utility function and w is the wage
level. Married people have u(w,w′) = ww′
2
where men with wage w marry women with
w′. Becker (1973, 1974) indicated that empirical evidence shows a positive correlation
between the traits of partners, which is termed as positive assortative mating. As
noted in Shimer and Smith(2000), Lu and Macfee(1996), this simple assumption on
utility form guarantees mating is positive assortative, so agents in this economy are
always motivated to match with higher-type ones.
Labor Market Labor market is simplified and individuals are characterized
by wages. Each individual here is offered with wage w that is randomly drawn
from a log-normal distribution. In the steady state equilibrium, the individual wage
distribution remains unchanged. So in the decentralized marriage market, assume
that their employment conditions are unchanged and theb the singles have their
expectation that to whom they should propose by maximizing utility.
Information The values of two potential partners {wm, ww} are instantly
observed on contact for men with wage wm and women with ww, respectively.
Market Structure In the marriage market, singles of opposite sex have the
opportunity to contact, and then decide to propose or not. If both sides propose,
they will get married and leave the market; otherwise, the singles continue searching
for partners. To whom they propose if meet depends on how quickly singles are
contacted, how soon marriage dissolves and their expectations of who would propose
to them.
Thus marriage market is characterized by offer arrival rates of both genders
λ and divorce rate δ. And offer arrival rates and divorce rates are assumed to be
exogenous. Offer arrival rates of potential partners {λk, k = mw} may differ by
gender, and both follow a Poisson process. Marriage dissolves once a divorce shock
hits with a rate δ.
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Value functions {Vk(w), k = m, w} denotes the value function for single
men or women with wage w. And W (w, w′) is defined as value function for those
married men with wage w and women with w′.
Singles meet each other every now and then. Based on the observed values
{w, w′} both decide to propose or not upon contact. Let ∆w,w′ be the decision rule
of whether women with wage w′ would like to accept men with wage w, so women
with wage w′ will only marry those with wage more than Rw(w′). The acceptance set
of men with wage w is defined as Am(w) and acceptance set of women with wage w
is similarly defined as Aw(w
′).
∆w,w′ =
{
1, if w ∈ Aw(w′) = [Rw(w′), w¯m];
0, otherwise.
where the reservation set Aw(w
′) is defined below.
Aw(w
′) = {w ∈ Y | W (w,w′) ≥ Vw(w′)}
= {w | w ≥ Rw(w′)}
Y denotes the supporting set of potential partners available for men with w. Rm(w)
is the reservation value for single men with w and Rw(w
′) for women with w′. Let
fm(w) and fw(w
′) be the wage density functions for men and women, respectively.
For the singles, we discuss the three possible outcomes during the process of
search.
• If both meet and propose, which occurs with probability λm
∫ w′
Rm
fw(w
′)∆w,w′dw′,
then marriage is formed and they left the market with value function W (w,w′).
• If both meet but at least one side disagree, with probability λm
∫ w′
Rm
fw(w
′)(1−
∆w,w′)dw
′ +
∫ Rm
w′ fw(w
′)dw′, they remain single with value function Vm(w) and
Vf (w
′).
• If no meet occurs, they have to wait another period and remain single.
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Then the value function of being single satisfies the below equation.
Vm(w) = w + βλm{
∫ w′
Rm
W (w,w′)fw(w′)∆w,w′dw′
+
∫ w′
Rm
Vm(w)fw(w
′)(1−∆w,w′)dw′
+
∫ Rm
w′ Vm(w)fw(w
′)dw′}+ β(1− λm)Vm(w)
For those married, they stay married until divorce shock strikes.
W (w,w′) = ww′/2 + β{(1− δ)W (w,w′) + δVm(w)}
After transforming the above equations, the value of being single is
Vm(w) =
w + βλm
∫ w¯′
Rm
W (w,w′)fw(w′)∆w,w′dw′
1− β + βλm
∫ w¯′
Rm
fw(w′)∆w,w′dw′
(1.1)
And the value function of men being married to women with w′ is
W (w,w′) =
ww′/2 + βδVm(w)
1− β(1− δ) (1.2)
Optimal policy By definition of reservation value, men with wage w would
like to propose for women with w′ ≥ Rm(w). Similarly, women with wage w′ would
like to propose if men with w ≥ Rw(w′).
Given that the steady state equilibrium exists (we will prove this in the next
section, and actually the equilibrium is unique under some given conditions), ev-
ery man has a reservation wage that W (w,Rm) = Vm(w) and every woman has
W (w,Rm) = Vm(w). In equilibrium, optimal policy of singles is partitioning the
whole population into classes by their wages. Each individual with wage w falls
in some specific class denoted by [Ri(w),Mi(w)], i = m,w where Ri(·) denotes the
reservation value, and Mi(·) denotes the best candidates they can obtain and it is
endogenously generated by the reservation values of the whole population.
From the reservation policy, W (w,Rm) = Vm(w), the reservation value for
men with wage w is derived in Appendix A and is displayed as below.
Rm(w) = 2 +
βλm
1− β(1− δ)
∫ w¯′
Rm
(w′ −Rm)fw(w′)∆w,w′dw′ (1.3)
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By symmetry, the policy function of women with w′ is,
Rw(w
′) = 2 +
βλw
1− β(1− δ)
∫ w¯m
Rw
(w −Rw)fm(w)∆w,w′dw (1.4)
1.2.2 Existence of Equilibrium and Its Properties
In this section, we prove in detail the existence of equilibrium, which is defined
as classes under the given conditions. And then we characterize it.
(NE) The Nash equilibrium is defined by a set of response functions Rm(·)
for men and Rw(·) for women in the marriage market. The reservation functions give
the cut-off rules of marriage decisions and they also satisfy the equations (1.3) and
(1.4).
(SSE) The steady state equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium (NE) as above that
has a balanced flow, meaning that the population that gets married and exits the
marriage market equals those getting divorce and re-entering the market.
Given the definition of equilibrium, we start with studying the Nash equilib-
rium.
Proposition 1. (Existence of Optimal Policy for Men)
Assume that men have their value function satisfying W (w,ww) ≤ Vm(w) and
W (w, w¯w) ≥ Vm(p) for any wage w, where the close set [ww, w¯w] gives the bounds
of women’s wage, then there exists an unique set of response function Rm(·), as a
mapping from men’s wages to their reservation values, assuring that W (w,Rm) =
Vm(w).
Proof. See the appendix C.
Similarly, we have for women the proposition of existence of optimal policy as
below.
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Proposition 2. (Existence of Optimal Policy for Women)
Assume that women have their value function satisfying W (wm, w
′) ≤ Vw(w′)
and W (w¯m, w
′) ≥ Vw(w′) for any wage w′, where the close set [wm, w¯m] gives the
bounds of men’s wage, then there exists an unique set of response function Rw(·), as
a mapping from women’ wages to their reservation values, assuring thatW (Rw, w
′) =
Vw(w
′).
Based on the existence of policy function for both men and women Rm and
Rw, we next examine its properties and then the characteristics of equilibrium. Before
that we set up one basic assumption.
Assumption 1 The best men and women are desirable, so the rest of popula-
tion are always willing to propose to them, that is, ∀w,∆w,w¯w = 1 and ∀w′,∆w¯m,w′ = 1.
Proposition 3. (Formation of The First Class)
Given assumption 1 that the best wo/men can always get proposal from op-
posite sex, there exists a unique set of critical wages {R1m, R1w} so that
• Any men falling in [R1w, w¯m] are willing to propose to women in the set of
[R1m, w¯w].
• Any women falling in [R1m, w¯w] are willing to propose to men in the set of
[R1w, w¯m].
where R1m is defined as the reservation value of the best men and R
1
w is of the best
women. So the men with w ∈ [R1w, w¯m] and women with w′ ∈ [R1m, w¯w] form a class of
people who are willing to accept each other and get married. Since the upper bounds
lie in the best men and women, we name this group of men and women the first class.
Proof. See the appendix C.
10
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
Men
W
o m
e n
ClassI
ClassII
ClassIII
men
women
Figure 1.1: Partition of Classes in Marriage Market – Reservation Functions of Both
Genders. The x axis gives the reservation value of men and y axis is of women. There
are 5 classes displayed as Class I, Class II, Class III and so on. Only men and women
in the same class marry each other.
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Proposition 4. (The whole market is divided into n classes.)
The population in marriage market partition themselves into classes. Let
[wm, w¯m] be the bounds for men and [ww, w¯w] for women. The n partition is repre-
sented by [wm = R
nm
m , R
nm−1
m , ..., R
1
m, R
0
m = w¯m] for men, and [ww = R
nw
w , R
nw−1
w , ..., R
1
w, R
0
w =
w¯m] for women, and n = min{nm, nw}, where nm is the number of partition for men
and nw is for women .
• Class 1 is defined as [R1w, R0w = w¯m]× [R1m, R0m = w¯w].
• Class k is defined as [Rkw, Rk−1w ]× [Rkm, Rk−1m ], ∀k ∈ {1, 2, ..., n = min{nm, nw}}.
• In a steady state equilibrium, men in class k only marry women in class k.
• δn = nm − nw ∈ {−1, 0, 1}. δn = 0 means in economy there exists n classes –
steady state equilibrium. If δn = −1 or 1, one gender has one more class than
the other. Then those in n+1 class can not be matched and never get married.
Proof. See the appendix C.
This proposition provides the algorithm to compute the reservation functions
for Nash equilibrium. It also gives the existence of a unique set of optimal policy
function.
Corollary 5. (Existence of Nash Equilibrium)
There exists a unique Nash equilibrium (NE). All the population are divided
into distinct classes and people marry by class. The reservation function is illustrated
as in figure 1.1.
So in our model, there exist one and only one Nash equilibrium that satisfies
the equations (1.3) and (1.4). And the algorithm to obtain the reservation functions
are presented in appendix B.
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Next, we give the conditions that guarantee the balanced flow – steady state
equilibrium (SSE). Let γmn denote the proportion of men in class n, which is defined
in Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 6. (Special Conditions that Guarantee the Existence of SSE)
Given the distribution for both genders is log concave, then for any class n > 0,
a unique partition ({Rm(·), γmn}, {Rw(·), γwn}) exists that guarantees a balanced flow
and satisfies equations (1.3) and (1.4) and the boundary conditions that (a) best
men in class 1 have w¯m, (b)best women in class 1 have w¯w, (c)Rm(wm) ≤ wm and
(d)Rw(ww) ≤ ww.
Proof. See the appendix C.
The log- concavity of survivor function implies that given the current setting,
there exists a unique steady state that is the nash equilibrium and also balances the
population inflow and outflow of the marriage market. At last we describe the general
properties of steady state equilibrium as below.
Lemma 7. (Property of Equilibrium (I))
• Rm(·) is non-decreasing in w.
• Vm(·) is increasing in w.
• W (·, w′) is increasing in w.
Lemma 8. (Property of Equilibrium (II))
From equation (1.3) and (1.4), {Rm(·), Rw(·)} depends on
• λ – how soon people meet their potential partners
• f(·) – wage distribution of both genders.
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1.3 Simulation: What Affects Marriage Outcomes?
Our model generates a steady state equilibrium, which hold as in Burdett
and Coles (1997). The reservation functions, as claim in Lemma 8, depend on both
the arrival rates – how soon potential partners meet each other – and their wage
distribution. Marriage rates the aggregate outcomes of individual marital choices
depend on reservation functions and therefore are also determined by arrival rates
and wage offer. In this section, we simulate by numerical methods and illustrate the
effect of arrival rates and wage inequality on marriage outcomes.
1.3.1 The Effect of Arrival Rate on Marriage Rate
We set constants at the MSA level as in table 1.1. Time discount factor is .99
and divorce rate is at .002. Then following the algorithm describe in appendix B, we
will obtain the moments of the single ratios for both genders.
Table 1.1: Constants
Const Value
Time Discount Factor β .99
Divorce Rate δ .002
Sex Ratio r .49
Mean of Male Hourly Wage σm 15.36
Mean of Female Hourly Wage σw 9.50
Std. Err of Male Hourly Wage σm 8.98
Std. Err of Female Hourly Wage σw 6.17
Constants are at MSA level in 1970 for the white
men aged from 21-40 and women from 21-35 at
year 1990 dollar value.
Sex ratio is the fraction of male in the whole
population.
Figure 1.2 shows the effect of arrival rates on female single rate. On average,
the higher male arrival rate, the higher female arrival rate, the higher single rate.
But when male arrival rate is extremely high, for example .7, and female arrival rate
is extremely low, less than .2, then this effect is now reversed. Meanwhile, we have
the similar single ratio for men. In figure 1.3 we display a 3-dimension surface plot
14
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Figure 1.2: Effect of Female Arrival Rate on Female Single Ration Given Male Arrival
Rate. The X axis gives the arrival rate of women. The Y axis is the single ratio of
the women population. Male Arrival Rates are given at .3, .5 and .7 respectively.
of female single ratio given the arrival rates of men and women. In the low end of
arrival rates, when fixing male (female) arrival rate, rising female (male) arrival rate
increases female single ratio. When both arrival rate vary, however, the outcome of
female single ratio could be mixed.
1.3.2 The Effect of Wage Inequality on Marriage Rate
This subsection makes simple simulations to illustrates the effect of increasing
male wage inequality on female marriage choices. We simulate aggregate marriage
rate via the process of marriage formation.
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Figure 1.3: 3-Dimension Surface Plot of Female Single Ratio Given Arrival Rates of
Men and Women. The X axis gives the arrival rate of women. The Y axis gives the
arrival rate of men and the Z axis is the single ratio of the women population.
Table 1.2: Parameters for Simula-
tion
Parameter Value
Arrival Rate of Men λm .3
Arrival Rate of Women λw .3
Number of Simulation: 10000.
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1.3.2.1 Increase in male wage inequality induces the emerging classes in
marriage market.
Given the same set of parameters as in table 1.1 and 1.2, we simulate a marriage
market with the pool of single men and women with log-normal wage distribution
shown in figure 1.4, where the upper row gives the simulated wage distribution for
both men and women. The lower row is the reservation function of marriage choice
from equilibrium. Figure 1.5 gives the female single ratio as a function of wage
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Figure 1.4: Simulated Data at Individual Level. The upper row gives the simulated
wage distribution for both men and women. The lower row is the reservation function
of marriage choice from equilibrium.
inequality in two separate cases.
• If only male wage inequality rises but female inequality is fixed at the current
level (in table 1.1), female single ratio rises to 60% from the recorded 25%.
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• If both inequalities rise at the same pace, the former increasing trend vanishes:
the female single ratio flats out, staying around 30%.
This observed difference reveals that, wage inequality leads to the mismatch in mar-
riage market only if men and women are driven by asymmetric change in wage distri-
bution. Otherwise – if both reservation value of men and women moves in the same
direction from equilibrium – this mismatch effect offsets each other, and none or little
mismatch could be observed.
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Figure 1.5: Response Simulation: The Effect of Male Wage Inequality on Female
Single Ratio.
This mismatch effect caused by gender asymmetry in wage inequality is further
interpreted in figure 1.6, where the x axis gives male wage inequality, the y axis gives
female wage inequality in form of standard deviation of hourly wage, and the z axis
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stands for the female single ratio in unit of percentage. When female wage inequality
is fixed, raising male wage inequality could increase or decrease female single ratio,
depending on at which level inequality is. However, when male and female wage
inequality move in the same direction, we observe less increase in female single ratio
due to the less mismatch.
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Figure 1.6: Response Simulation: The Effect of Changing Male and Female Wage
Inequality on Female Single Ratio. The x axis gives male wage inequality, the y axis
gives female wage inequality in form of standard deviation of hourly wage, and the z
axis stands for the female single ratio in unit of percentage.
Figure 1.7 shows the class partition as a function of male wage inequality. In
the 3-dimension figure, the x axis gives the categories of the classes ranging from
1 to 7, the y axis displays male wage inequality in form of standard deviation of
hourly wage, and the z axis stands for the frequency, the number of men out of total
population (10,000 simulated sample) that falls in each specific sub-market, given the
level of male wage inequality.
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Figure 1.7: The Sub-market Differentiation as the result of increasing male wage
inequality. The x axis gives the categories for the classes, the y axis displays male
wage inequality in form of standard deviation of hourly wage, and the z axis stands for
the frequency, the number of men out of total population (10,000 simulated sample)
that falls in each specific class.
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The results of figure 1.7 show that, when male wage inequality is at the 70%
of current value (indexed as 1), there exist only four classes, and the majority of men
are in the second class (middle class). As wage inequality rises to the same as the
current value (indexed as 4), the number of classes goes up to five: the new class
is generated, and more men are observed to spread out along middle class(indexed
as 2 and 3). At the very extreme case that wage inequality doubles (indexed as 8),
totally seven classes co-exist; the emerging classes take away more population from
the former existing classes. The fraction of population falling in each class evolves as
a result of changing wage inequality.
1.3.2.2 When wage inequality rises, who delays the marriage?
The argument of who delaying the marriage is of interest to those support-
ing marriage (compared to anti - marriage), though this question is hard to address
in the survey data. Our model contributes in making predictions of women’s mar-
riage choice. The predictions improve our perception of the impact of inequality on
marriage outcomes and thus is useful for policy evaluation.
The analysis of who delaying marriage is displayed in figure 1.8 under three
settings of male wage inequality: { 60% of current value (.6Cv), current value (Cv)
and double current value (2Cv)}, ordering from left to right in Figure 6. The upper
row gives the number of observations and number of samples that delay marriage for
men and women, respectively.
And the lower row gives the fraction of population that delays marriage or
rejects offers. When male wage inequality is at the value of .6Cv, men in each sub-
market are more likely to reject women in response to the increase in wage inequality,
because of a better outside options compared to that of women. At the current
wage inequality or 2Cv, high-income women are more likely to reject the proposals,
since better outside option they have, more likely they would wait longer rather than
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marrying someone below their economic strata. This is also interpreted as ”marrying
down”.
1.4 Empirical Estimation and Structure Recovery
To isolate wage inequality from the time trend of marriage market is hard
since in empirical study the decline in marriage rates are accompanied with increas-
ing wage inequality across time. So in this section we are to recover the efficiency and
elasticity for matching function that characterize the underlying economic environ-
ments. Matching with IPUMS data from year 1970 to 2000, we estimates two-sided
matching model and recover parameters that characterize the U.S. marriage market
for the past decades.
1.4.1 Data
1.4.1.1 The Sample
The data, used for our present analysis, come from Integrated Public Use
Microdata Series (IPUMS). We take year 1970 Form 2 Metro sample together with
year 1980, 1990 and 2000 1% sample data. The sample is cross-sectional and restricted
to include only the white people living in metropolitan areas (MSA). Let the marriage
market be counties or combinations of counties centering on a substantial urban area.
We focus on men aged between 21-40 and women between 21-35. This pop-
ulation group is viewed most likely to be affected by the current marriage market
conditions. Those aged less than 20 years are excluded since many of them have
not complete their education. Being single is defined as never married before, which
equals to 1, if women report they have never been married before till the survey year,
and 0 otherwise. As a result, we are left with 803,495 female observations ranging
over 200 metropolitan areas.
As to the wage information, we consider only those who are not currently in
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Figure 1.8: Given three settings of male wage inequality: { 60% of current value
(.6Cv), current value (Cv) and double current value (2Cv)}, ordering from left to
right in the upper row, the upper row gives the number of observations, and the
lower row the number of samples that delay for both men and women, respectively.
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school, work full-time and worked at least 1 week in the previous year. A full-time
worker supposes to work at least 35 hours per week. People out of labor force are
excluded. Measure of wage is constructed on a yearly basis. Total earnings report
a respondent’s total pre-tax wage and salary income, that is, money received as an
employee for the previous year. Log hourly wage is calculated by taking log of the
amount of total earnings divided by weeks worked and working hours per week.
Wage inequality here is measured by the standard deviation of log hourly wage,
though using other specifications such as 90th-10th percentiles or Gini coefficients
reveal the similar increasing trends of wage inequality across time. Note that we use
hourly wage, rather than weekly or yearly wage earnings, to eliminate the effect of
seasonal variation on labor supply.
1.4.1.2 Descriptive Analysis
This section presents descriptive statistics from year 1970, 1980, 1990 and
2000 1% IPUMS data. Table 1.3 presents summary statistics of age, education,
martial status and local labor market information for year 1970, 1980, 1990 and
2000, respectively. The fraction of white women living in metropolitan areas (MSA),
aged between 21-35 years who remain single rose from 15% in 1970, to 21% in 1980,
to 26% in 1990 and to 32% in 2000.
Male wage inequality, in form of the standard deviation of hourly wage (in
1990 dollar value), grew from 8.98 in 1970, to 12.25 in 1980, to 18.66 in 1990 and
26.86 in 2000. Meanwhile, female wage inequality grew from 6.17 in 1970, to 7.69 in
1980, to 10.11 in 1990 and 18.78 in 2000. The upward trends of both wage inequality
and single rate have been quite obvious.
Also, from year 1970 to 2000, the fraction of women participating in labor
force rises by 50% of year 1970 value. Fraction of white women that receive college
education rises from 28% in 1970 to 64% in 2000. Till year 2000, over one third of
24
women have college degrees.
Table 1.3: Cross-sectional Descriptive Statistics by MSA and Year
Variable Definition Y1970 Y1980 Y1990 Y2000
Sex Ratio Males age 21-35/total 21-35 .46 .49 .49 .50
Age Average female age 27.5 27.9 28.8 29.0
log N Mean Log Population in MSA 13.12 12.84 12.84 13.18
Marital Status of Females
Never Married/Single % of females never married .15 .21 .26 .32
Current Married % of females currently married .78 .67 .63 .57
Education Level(%)
Higrad High School Graduate .483 .446 .354 .268
Somecoll Some College .156 .207 .310 .300
College College Graduate .127 .194 .242 .337
Employment Status
Male EmpStat Males currently employed/tot .929 .903 .905 .869
Female EmpStat Females currently employed/tot .463 .626 .732 .719
Wage ($)
Male µ Mean Male Hourly Wage 15.36 14.30 14.76 16.70
Female µ Mean Female Hourly Wage 9.50 9.25 10.79 13.06
Male σ std Male Hourly Wage 8.98 12.25 18.66 26.86
Female σ std Female Hourly Wage 6.17 7.69 10.11 18.78
Sample is restricted to women aged between 21-35.
Data source: Year 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000 IPUMS.
Nominal variables were converted to year 1990 dollar value by CPI.
1.4.2 Estimation Strategy
To isolate the change of marriage market from wage inequality, we first recover
from the matching function the key parameters such as the matching efficiency and
elasticity. Then we make the probit regression of being single on wage inequality as
well as market environments.
We start with the matching function. Letting ηt be the elasticity at year t and
ψi,t be the matching efficiency in MSA i at time t, the matching function is
m(ni,tm , n
i,t
w ) = ψi,t(n
i,t
m)
ηt(ni,tw )
(1−ηt).
where ni,tm and n
i,t
w denote the population of single men and women, respectively. Note
here we assume constant elasticity of substitution, that is, the sum of elasticity for men
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and women at the MSA level is 1. This assumption is to be revisited and tested after
parameterizations of arrival rates in the later section of empirical implementation.
Assume that for each MSA i, the matching efficiency is drawn from a normal
distribution,
ψi,t ∼ N(ψt, σψ,t).
To obtain the market structure for each decade, point estimation of the matching
efficiency distribution {ψt, σψ,t} on a yearly basis is necessary.
During the process of point estimation we plug the arrival rates in matching
function where the MSA-specific demographic information is used. In particular ni,tm
and ni,tw are obtained via MSA demographic information as sex ratio r
i,t, single ratio
{si,tm , si,tw } and total population N i,t. And sex ratio ri,t is defined as the percentage of
men, falling in the same range of age, out of the total population for the metropolitan
areas i. Following the matching function we have
ni,tm = N
i,tri,tsi,tm , n
i,t
w = N
i,t(1− ri,t)si,tw .
Here sim, s
i
w are in equilibrium outcomes of single ratios for both men and women.
Then transforming the matching function, the arrival rates of marriage market for
MSA i are
λi,tm =
ψi,t(n
i,t
m)
ηt(ni,tw )
(1−ηt)
ni,tm
,
λi,tw =
ψi,t(n
i,t
m)
ηt(ni,tw )
(1−ηt)
ni,tw
.
Given a vector of parameters such as arrival rates, we are able to simulate data
for each decade at the MSA level by the process presented in appendix B. Note that
each MSA has a unique set of demographic information as sex ratio ri,t, labor market
condition and population that characterize the metropolitan areas. So the single
ratio differs by MSA. The scatter plots of the simulated single ratio for each MSA are
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shown (on the left column) in figure 1.9, compared with those from data (on the right
column). The rows represents plots for year 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000 (from top to
bottom), respectively. We present the comparisons of female single ratio between the
simulated data and real data, and each circle represents one specific MSA area. The
simulated MSA data shares the similar features in mean and standard errors as that
of the sample data. It mimics the increasing trend of single ratio for those MSA cities
with higher inequality.
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Figure 1.9: Comparison of Single Ratio for Women at MSA level: Simulated data
versus real data. The right column gives the simulated MSA data, and each circle
represents one MSA city. The left column is that of the real data.
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1.4.3 Empirical Implementation
Let the vector of parameters θ be:
θ = {ψt, σψ,t, ηt}t=1970,1980,1990,2000.
where ψt and σψ,t represents at the year t the distribution of matching efficiency. ηt
gives the elasticity that represents the return to men.
Meanwhile, for each decade, the cross-sectional mean and standard error of
marriage rates at MSA level are used as moments as in table 1.4. Let {ski,t, k = m,w}
be the single ratio at MSA i in year t, the moment vector to be estimated, µd, is
defined as below and listed in table 1.4.3.
µd = {s¯mt , s¯wt , σms,t, σws,t}t=1970,1980,1990,2000.
where
s¯mt =
1
n
n∑
i=1
smi,t, s¯
w
t =
1
n
n∑
i=1
swi,t,
σms,t =
1
n− 1
n∑
i=1
(smi,t − s¯mt )2, σws,t =
1
n− 1
n∑
i=1
(swi,t − s¯wt )2,
Table 1.4: Moments from Cross-Sectional Data at MSA Level
Moment(µd) Year1970 Year1980 Year1990 Year2000
Mean of Male Single Ratio s¯mt .2030 .3030 .3622 .4345
Mean of Female Single Ratio s¯wt .1788 .2685 .3120 .3923
Std. Dev. of Male Single Ratio σms,t .0421 .0547 .0538 .0506
Std. Dev. of Female Single Ratio σws,t .0340 .0530 .0579 .0552
Single ratio is at MSA level for the white men aged from 21-40 and women from 21-35.
As indicated by Equation (1, 2), from equilibrium the reservation functions can
be derived given a vector of parameters θ. Known the reservation value {Ri,tm (θ), Ri,tw (θ)},
by repeating the simulated matching process 50 times, we arrive at marriage rates for
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each MSA. Finally, simulated moments of cross-sectional mean and standard error of
single rate are obtained.
µs(θ) = µs({Ri,tm (θ), Ri,tw (θ)}).
Simulated Method of Moments (SMM) are applied to find the parameter vector θ that
minimizes the distance between the simulated moments and moments from data. In
the meanwhile, data IPUMS of year 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000, offers the demo-
graphic information on sex ratio, mean and standard deviation of hourly wages for
men and women for each MSA. Optimal parameter set θ is the point that minimizes
the distance.
θ∗ = min
θ
(µs(θ)− µd)W ∗−1(µs(θ)− µd)′,
1.4.4 Parameterization
The recovered parameters of market structure for each decade are listed in
table 1.5. And table 1.6 compares the simulated moments and moments from data.
The recovered parameters reveal the structure change of marriage market across time.
We have two main observations displayed in table 1.5.
First, the mean of matching efficiency, ψt, in the upper row of table 1.5, rises
from .1066 in year 1970, to .2101 in year 1980, .5021 in 1990 and .6130 in 2000. This
increasing trend implies larger arrival rates and more efficient two-sided-matching in
marriage market across time.
Second, the elasticity (return to men) in the lower row of table 1.5, falls from
.4345 in 1970, to .4153 in 1980, .3543 in 1990 and .3011 in 2000. This phenomenon
is barely mentioned in the past studies. It is at least caused in part by the increase
of women’s participation in labor supply and improved women education.
Table 1.6 lists out the comparisons between the simulated moments and mo-
ments from data. The results of simulation match well with sample moments. The
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Table 1.5: Parameter Estimates
Moment Year1970 Year1980 Year1990 Year2000
Mean of Matching Efficiency .1066 .2101 .5021 .6130
Std. Dev of Matching Efficiency .0956 .0999 .1037 .1073
Elasticity (Return to Men) .4345 .4153 .3543 .3011
simulated data mimic the trend of declining marriage rates for both genders and
increasing cross-sectional variance of single ratio from year 1970-2000.
The increase in the mean of cross-sectional matching efficiency predicts a
higher arrival ratio in the marriage market. Since more options are provided, both
men and women could be more selective since they can afford to be more selective in
marriage choice; Also marriage could be more easily formed since the improvement
of marriage market. In the second application, we will come back to analyzing the
influence of these two effects on marriage rates.
And the increased favoring towards women is worthy attention, which could
be another factor that generates asymmetry of men and women, and it can lead to
the decline in marriage rate across time.
1.5 Implication of MSA-Specific Matching Efficiency
Empirical estimation reveals the structural change of the U.S. marriage market
in the past decades. But how much of wage inequality, after excluding this time trend,
amounts for the decline of marriage rate remains unknown. Once we pin down the
matching efficiency ψi,t, we can decompose the decline of marriage rate for women
after including the structural change as matching efficiency to study the impact of
inequality on marriage outcomes.
1.5.1 Factors that Affect Matching Efficiency
We regress the matching efficiency on city specific information, year, local
market condition(mean and standard errors of wage), sex ratio, population, average
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Table 1.6: Comparison of Simulated Moments and Sample Mo-
ments
Moment Description Sample Moment Simulated Moments
Year 1970
Mean of Male Single Ratio .2030 .2243
Mean of Female Single Ratio .1788 .1962
Std. Err of Male Single Ratio .0421 .0444
Std. Err of Male Single Ratio .0340 .0397
Year 1980
Mean of Male Single Ratio .3030 .2903
Mean of Female Single Ratio .2685 .2785
Std. Err of Male Single Ratio .0547 .0603
Std. Err of Male Single Ratio .0530 .0499
Year 1990
Mean of Male Single Ratio .3622 .3207
Mean of Female Single Ratio .3120 .3199
Std. Err of Male Single Ratio .0538 .0672
Std. Err of Male Single Ratio .0579 .0535
Year 2000
Mean of Male Single Ratio .4345 .4003
Mean of Female Single Ratio .3923 .3654
Std. Err of Male Single Ratio .0506 .0547
Std. Err of Male Single Ratio .0552 .0530
age and MSA fixed effects to see if it is significant lying on wage inequality.
As shown in Table 1.7, in the first column of the regression case without arrival
rates, matching efficiency is positive correlated with sex ratio at the value of .9071,
single ratio at .0018 and the fraction of population getting employed at .1400; it also
negatively depends on the percentage of college graduate at the value of -.0011. When
arrival rates are included in regressors, as in Columns two, matching efficiency now
mainly depends on arrival rates of both genders, that is, arrival rates much absorb the
effect of other regressors. Meanwhile, no significant correlation is observed between
inequality and matching efficiency.
We say arrival rates better represent the market structure than matching effi-
ciency does, which will be further addressed in the next chapter.
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Table 1.7: Regression of Matching Efficiency
Without Arrival Rates With Arrival Rates
Demographic Variables
log population in MSA -.0078 -.0011**
(.0056) (.0012)
Sex ratio .9071** -.0270*
(.0760) (.0143)
Average Single Ratio .0018** -.0002**
(.0004) (.0001 )
Average Age -.1667 -.0771
(.4696) (.0659)
Average Age Squared -.0027 .0011
(.0078) (.0011)
% of Education Level
High school graduate dummy .0004 -.0001
(.0008) (.0001)
Some college dummy .0012** -.0001
(.0004) (.0001)
College graduate dummy -.0011** -.0002*
(.0005) (.0001)
Labor Market Variables
Standard deviation of male hourly wage in MSA -.0542* -.0017
(.0094) (.0020)
Standard deviation of female hourly wage in MSA .0073* .0056
(.0161) (.0033)
Mean male hourly wage in MSA .0441** .0036
(.0118) (.0031)
Mean female hourly wage in MSA -.0015 -.0096*
(.0168) (.0046)
Average Employment Status .1400* .0603*
(.0721) (.0303)
Recovered Marriage Market Structure
Arrival Rate for Men λm .4931**
(.0148)
Arrival Rate for Women λw .5239**
(.0105)
Year Dummy
Year 1980 .2356** -.0148*
(.0296) (.0075)
Year 1990 .3569** -.0054
(.0824) (.0180)
Year 2000 .3120** .0242**
(.0331) (.0066)
MSA Fixed Effects Yes Yes
MSA Specific Time Trend Yes Yes
R2 .7684 .9937
Dependent Variable is the recovered matching efficiency. Regression controls for MSA specific
information on average age, education level, labor market condition with fixed MSA effects and
time trend. And the standard errors are in parentheses. Data Source: IPUMS data from 1970,
1980, 1990, 2000.
* Variables are 5% significant.
** Variable are 1% significant.
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1.5.2 Empirical Analysis: What Determines Marriage Decisions?
Given the independency of wage inequality and matching efficiency, we make
a Probit regression of women being single on regressors as in Gould (2003). Based on
the different purposes, the combination of regressors are categorized into four types as
listed in table 1.8. Since wage inequality and matching efficiency are independent with
each other, the type (IV) – regression on arrival rates and wage inequality decomposes
the decline of marriage rates.
Table 1.8: Regression Type Indexing
Type Index Combination
Type I Basic – fixed MSA effect and time trend
Type II (I)+ recovered arrival rates λ
Type III (II)+ recovered matching efficiency ψ
Type IV (II)+ recovered arrival rate λ + its square λ2.
Table 1.9 gives the regression coefficients of female being single. The estimates
for type I is shown in first column in table 1.9. Positive correlation, around value
of 0.0107, is observed between male wage inequality and probability of females being
single at 5% percent of significant level. Average male hourly wage - labor market for
males - raises the propensity of females to marry with the value of .0159, and induces a
lower single ratio. We control for age, age squared, year, education dummies and MSA
specific effects, and the corresponding coefficients are mostly statistical significant.
Type II regression (in column two) includes arrival rates as the value .0193,
greater than that in type I, implying that the added arrival rates isolate the factors
that contributes to marriage formation, suggesting that the effect of wage inequality
on marriage rates is under-estimated under type I.
Type III use the recovered matching efficiency, instead of arrival rates, as the
instruments of marriage market structure for each MSA. Similar results are obtained
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Table 1.9: Probit Regression of Women Being Single
Type I Type II Type III Type IV
Demographic Variables
log population in MSA -.0039 .0031 .0048** .0025
(.0021) (.0021) (.0019) (.0023)
Sex ratio .1038** .0475 -.0092 -.0788*
(.0303) (.0338 ) (.0331) (.0368)
% of Population Employed .2047** .1903** .1801* .1800*
(.0392) (.0302 ) (.0331) (.0350)
Education Level and Age
High school graduate dummy -.0216** -.0217** -.0215** -.0214**
(.0044) (.0044) (.0044) (.0044)
Some college dummy .0201** .0199** .0204** .0204**
(.0027) (.0026) (.0027) (.0027)
College graduate dummy .0708** .0708** .0716** .0714**
(.0044) (.0044) (.0044) (.0043)
Age -.1152** -.1154** -.1153** -.1154**
(.0058) (.0058) (.0058) (.0058)
Age squared .0017** .0017** .0017** .0017**
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0000)
Labor Market Variables
Standard deviation of log male hourly wage in MSA .0107* .0193** .0198** .0249**
(.0051) (.0046) (.0050) (.0046)
Standard deviation of log female hourly wage in MSA -.0116* -.0113** -.0270** -.0255**
(.0059) (.0051) (.0053) (.0049)
Mean male hourly wage in MSA -.0159** -.0224** -.0253** -.0284**
(.0058) (.0048) (.0050) (.0046)
Mean female hourly wage in MSA .0279** .0250** .0429** .0372**
(.0072) (.0060) (.0057) (.0053)
Recovered Marriage Market Structure
MSA matching efficiency ψi,t .0917
(.0647)
Squared MSA matching efficiency ψ2i,t .0434
(.0527)
Arrival Rate for Men λm .0414* -.4396**
(.0209) (.1361)
Arrival Rate for Women λw .0977** .2655**
(.0145) (.0923)
Arrival Rate Squared for Men λ2m .5063**
(.1363)
Arrival Rate Squared for Women λ2w -.0999**
(.0566)
Year Dummy
Year 1980 .1166** .0736** .1105** .0942**
(.0140) (.0115) (.0102) (.0101)
Year 1990 .0894** .0556* .0855* .1030**
(.0308) (.0290) (.0262) (.0305)
Year 2000 .1652** .1139** .1658* .1550**
(.0168) (.0154) (.0145) (.0137)
MSA Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
MSA Specific Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dependent Variable is probit variable for female being single. Regression controls for age, year,
education and MSA effects. And standard errors are in parentheses. Sample restricted to women
age between 25-35. Data Source: IPUMS 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000
* Variables are 5% significant.
** Variable are 1% significant.
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as type I and II. But the coefficients of matching efficiency and its squared are not
statistically significant, therefore, arrival rates better represent the structural change
of marriage market.
The above types give the similar results as did in Gould(2003), Blau and
Kahn(2000). In type (II) to (IV), we incorporate the recovered marriage market
structural ψi,t or arrival rates λ, which are in general unobservable from data, to ex-
amine the effect of marriage structure as well as wage inequality on people’s marriage
decisions.
In type IV, we add the squared arrival rates ψi,t besides those regressors in type
(II). The coefficient on male wage inequality is with an increasing magnitude at value
of .0198 for type (III) and .0249 for type (IV). Wage inequality remains significant at
the 1% level. The robustness of positive correlation show that, part of the decline in
female marriage rate is caused alone by wage inequality. The most interesting thing is,
the added market structure in type IV implies that, MSA with higher female arrival
rate is accompanied with higher probability of female being single (with coefficient
.2655), and MSA with higher male arrival rate is with less probability of female being
single (with coefficient -.4396). Meanwhile, when arrival rates are higher than some
critical points, these trends are reversed, because for the coefficient of squared male
arrival rate is at the value of .5063 but that of squared male arrival rate is -.0999,
which are significant at the 1% level.
This observation reveals a two-directional effect, because MSA with higher
probability of being single also has higher arrival rates. So increasing arrival rates
lead to greater opportunity until over some point λ(0), and thereafter reverses the
trend.
This probit analysis also applies for men, as shown in Table 1.11. Different
from that of women, the probability of male being single is independent of male wage
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inequality, but negatively depends on female wage inequality. Similar bi-directional
effect of arrival rates are observed. And college men are less likely to remain single,
which is consistent with the past literature.
1.5.3 Decomposition of Marriage Rate
One standard application of our regression results is the decomposition of
the observed average marriage rates of females into the portion attributable to the
declining trends in the average values of explanatory variables.
In this subsection we decompose the decline of marriage rates to show how
much of the decline is due to increasing wage inequality, and how much is due to
change of marriage market such as arrival rates. In table 1.10 I present the de-
compositions using estimates from the various procedures mentioned the previous
regression.
The first row gives the coefficient of marginal effect of male inequality and
the next three rows give the average percentage of marriage rates that is explained
by inequality. The column of regression types are same as defined in table 1.8. In
particular without marriage market factors, only 21.02% of the overall decline in mar-
riage rates during year 1970 to 2000 is accounted by trends in inequality. Considering
the marriage market change across time and including factors as arrival rates, more
than 38% is explained by inequality. This shows that ignoring the change of marriage
market could underestimate the impact of inequality on marriage outcomes.
Table 1.10: Predicted Effects of Inequality on Marriage Trends
Type I Type II Type III Type IV
Coefficient of Std. Dev. of Male Log Hourly Wage .0107 .0193 .0198 .0249
Average % of Marriage Rates Explained
Year 1970-2000 0.2102 0.3792 0.3890 0.4892
Predicted effects are calculated by multiplying the marginal effect coefficient in table 1.9 by
the change in male inequality and dividing by the average change of single ratio of white
women aged 21-35.
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1.5.4 Test of Constant Return on Elasticity
Here we test if the return of elasticity is constant, given the recovered arrival
rates and MSA-specific information such as the number of single people. Now we
relax the assumption of matching function so that constant return is not necessary.
That is,
λi,tm =
ψi,t(n
i,t
m)
αt(ni,tw )
βt
ni,tm
,
where αt represents the elasticity of men and βt is that of women. Then by regress
the arrival rates on MSA-specific fixed effect and number of single people, implying
the coefficients of matching function.
log λi,tm = b0 + b1e
i,t + b2 log n
i,t
m + b3 log
ni,tw
ni,tm
,
= b0 + b1e
i,t + (αt + βt − 1) log ni,tm + βt log
ni,tw
ni,tm
,
where ei,t denotes the MSA fixed effect, generated by dummy MSA and time trend.
ni,tm , n
i,t
f are defined as the number of single men and women in MSA i at period t.
Then we test the hypothesis that the sum of α and β equals to 1 by checking whether
the second coefficient b2 = α+ β − 1 equals 0.
H0 : α+ β = 1, or, α+ β − 1 = 0
H1 : α+ β 6= 1,
H0 is not to be rejected since
bˆ2 − 0
σb2
=
−.080− 0
.044
= −.181 > −1.96,
the critical value falls within the 95% confidence interval of the student t-statistic.
So, the null hypothesis of constant return of elasticity, α+β = 1, can not be rejected.
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1.6 Conclusions
This work explores the effect of wage inequality on marriage decisions. In a
stationary equilibrium, studies in this area are far from complete. The main difficulty
lies in isolating wage inequality from other factors such as the time trend of marriage
market. This is partly due to the limitation of the survey data
I built up a two-sided matching model to simulate the process of marriage
formation. And this model bridges labor market performance and marriage outcomes,
which helps to derive from data the time trend of the U.S. marriage market. Using
the recovered parameters that characterize marriage market, we effectively isolate this
time trend from wage inequality.
Both my theoretical predictions and empirical results show that, structural
change of marriage market across time and increasing wage inequality contribute to
the decline in marriage rate. Rising wage inequality decrease the marriage rates by
producing more classes with smaller size in the marriage and leading to the mismatch.
Meanwhile, the effect of structural change of the U.S. marriage market is bi-
directional. Larger matching efficiency for both genders, and more gender equity
provide a more efficient and fairer marriage market with higher arrival rates. Yet
higher arrival rates raise the outside option of getting married. From theory the
aggregate outcomes are subject to two forces and could be mixed. Our empirical
results suggest that higher outside option and increasing wage inequality dominate
those benefits from improvements of marriage market in the past decades.
Finally, The decomposition of the decline of marriage rate shows that, con-
trolling for marriage market structure such as arrival rates, over 38% of the decline
in marriage rate is due to wage inequality, which effect is underestimated in Gould
(2003).
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Table 1.11: Probit Regression of Men Being Single
Type I Type II Type III Type IV
Demographic Variables
log population in MSA -.0096** .0080** .0091** .0082**
(.0023) (.0025) (.0023) (.0024)
Sex ratio -.0758** -.1813** -.1569** -.1948**
(.0280) (.0362 ) (.0351) (.0372)
% of Population Employed -.0792 .1042
(.0777) (.0752 )
Education Level and Age
High school graduate dummy .0110** .0109** .0110** -.0110*
(.0047) (.0047) (.0047) (.0047)
Some college dummy -.0252** -.0252** -.0262** -.0252*
(.0029) (.0029) (.0029) (.0029)
College graduate dummy -.0312** -.0312** -.0312** -.0312**
(.0036) (.0036) (.0036) (.0036)
Age -.0895** -.0895** -.0895** -.0895**
(.0038) (.0038) (.0038) (.0038)
Age squared .0012** .0012** .0012** .0012**
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
Labor Market Variables
Standard deviation of log male hourly wage in MSA -.0031 .0019 .0007 .0046
(.0047) (.0047) (.0047) (.0048)
Standard deviation of log female hourly wage in MSA -.0193** -.0190** -.0201** -.0215**
(.0068) (.0066) (.0067) (.0068)
Mean male hourly wage in MSA .0012 -.0021 -.0012 -.0040
(.0053) (.0053) (.0053) (.0053)
Mean female hourly wage in MSA .0330** .0318** .0335** .0335**
(.0070) (.0072) (.0071) (.0074)
Recovered Marriage Market Structure
MSA matching efficiency ψi,t .0714
(.0536)
Squared MSA matching efficiency ψ2i,t .0169
(.0474)
Arrival Rate for Men λm .0430* -.2381*
(.0203) (.1170)
Arrival Rate for Women λw .0638** .1368
(.0154) (.0793)
Arrival Rate Squared for Men λ2m .2978*
(.1172)
Arrival Rate Squared for Women λ2w -0.0421
(.0512)
Year Dummy
Year 1980 .0530** .0274 .0268 .0218
(.0143) (.0147) (.0144) (.0144)
Year 1990 -.0743** -.0868** -.0990** -.0945**
(.0305) (.0326) (.0301) (.0316)
Year 2000 .0294** -.0053** .-.0091 -.0156
(.0122) (.0137) (.0128) (.0126)
MSA Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
MSA Specific Time Trend Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dependent Variable is probit variable for male being single. Regression controls for age, year,
education and MSA effects. And standard errors are in parentheses. Sample restricted to men age
between 25-40. Data Source: IPUMS 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000
* Variables are 5% significant.
** Variable are 1% significant.
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Chapter 2
Search and Household Labor Supply
2.1 Introduction
Until now most studies pertaining to job search are addressed at the individual
level. Majority of the empirical work, however, is based on household data. The
discrepancy between individual-level search theory and household-level data invokes
noteworthy questions: to conduct empirical study on dynamic household labor supply,
can we simply treat household as two independent individuals, or take household as
a decision unit run by a single header?
The answers for both questions can be negative. Research on intra-household
allocation, in microeconomics, is quite rich. Lundberg and Pollak (1993) pointed out
that the uneven distribution within a family, caused by gender roles they played, de-
pends on the bargaining between husbands and wives. Meanwhile, Chiappori (1992),
Browning and Chiappori (1994, 1998) proposed the collective model, in which multi-
agent household is not treated as a single-header decision unit, and consumption of
each spouse is the outcomes of bargaining. As Chiappori (1992, 1998) mentioned,
the traditional treatment of household as a decision unit represented by the house-
hold header, though attractive and convenient, failed in family internal decision; yet,
the collective model – agents are characterized by their own preferences and house-
hold decisions are Pareto efficient – provides an alternative. Since no evidence shows
households behave the same as individuals, the previous empirical tests based on
individual-level models are questionable.
To explore dynamic household decisions on labor supply, we need to scru-
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tinize how household income is shared within household, and via what channel this
allocation affects job search behaviors of dual-earners. To probe the strategic decision-
making, I build up a discrete household search model under the collective framework.
To my best knowledge, it is the first one to connect the household dynamic labor
supply with intra-household allocation.
The main contribution of this chapter is two-fold. First, this work fills in
the research gap on couples’ job search. Flinn (2006) and Mabli (2006) examined the
household job search in the form of household utility. This chapter, however, provides
a theoretical avenue to relax the traditional assumption on household utility. Instead,
under the collective framework I study household decision. What distinguishes our
work from theirs is the use of individual utility, suggesting intra-household income
distribution the outcomes of intra-family bargaining. As intra-household income dis-
tribution depends on spousal labor market performance as employment status or wage
income, a theoretical investigation on intra-household decision becomes possible.
Second, this search model is adequate for empirical estimation at the household
level. Family problem was complicated, as Lundberg (2007) indicated, especially after
labor supply decision came in. The difficulty comes from two aspects. (1) Endogeneity
issue. Under dynamic setting, intra-household distribution – the share of household
income distributed to husbands and wives – depends on couples’ employment status
and earnings; meanwhile, decisions of labor supply also depend on intra-household
bargaining and wage offered. (2) Data limitation. The available data have limited
information on intra-household income allocation because private consumption of
husbands and wives is unobservable. In addition, panel data at household level are
required to track the job search. The unobserved consumption data together with
endogeneous dynamic decisions make this task intractable.
This chapter provides an alternative to this problem: a structural model is
formulated to simulate household job search and formation of their reservation wages,
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which can infer couples’ employment status and realized wages; such information is
available from data. Matching inferred household behaviors with empirical data,
we can recover household preferences and intra-household allocation. This approach
overcomes the limits of survey data, and enables empirical tests on intra-household
allocation.
Our results reveal that, husbands consumption is sensitive to their employ-
ment status. This sensitivity indicates the existence of bargaining between husbands
and wives. We also find that on average the monthly transfer from husbands to wives
is $1355. The recovered women labor supply indicates that higher women wage and
lower share from family raises women labor supply, suggesting that for wives, here
the income effect dominates. Moreover, the wage frontier of husbands are positively
correlated to wives wages and negatively correlated to the transfer to wives, mean-
ing that husbands decisions are subject to both income effect and intra-household
bargaining.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our theoretical frame-
work. Section 3 gives baseline results from model in section 3. Data is described in
section 4, and econometric specifications are displayed in section 5. Section 6 and
7 analyzes estimation results and its applications. The conclusions are discussed in
section 8.
2.2 Household Job Search Model
2.2.1 Environments
To study the individual behaviors in household job search, we develop a
discrete-time model in which husbands and wives search for jobs and make labor
supply decisions. Only the steady state is considered. Under our setting, husbands
and wives play a Nash game and make individual decisions, taking the spousal re-
sponse as given.
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Only two types of individuals – husbandsm and wives f – are considered. They
are married, infinitely-lived and discount the future at the rate β where β ∈ (0, 1).
Agents are characterized by their employment status and if working, their wage level.
Therefore, their states are described either employed with wage w, or not working. In
particular, wage equals zero, wi={m,f} = 0, if they are not working. Let wm represent
wage of husbands and wf of wives. During job search,job offer arrival follows a Poisson
process with λ. If employed, individuals could lose jobs with the probability of δ.
Household income (I) is the sum of couples’ wage income and their non-labor
income, I = wmhm + wfhf + y, where y denotes the exogenous non-labor income of
a family. If both work full-time, then hm > 0 and hf > 0,
2.2.2 Intrahousehold Bargaining
To describe the bargaining between husbands and wives, we adopt collective
model as in Chiappori (1992, 2002). Intra-household income allocation between hus-
bands and wives is therefore defined as the sharing rule φ, which represents the
proportion of household income consumed by husbands as a function of labor market
status of couples. The intuition is that, husbands private consumption out of total
household income depends on their wage income, spousal wage income as well as
family non-labor income. The intrahousehold income allocation is the outcomes of
bargaining. In particular, the sharing rule is termed as below.
φ = φ(Em, Ef , wm, wf , y),
where E{h=m,f} ∈ {0, 1} represents the employment status of husbands, and it equals
1 if they are employed and 0 otherwise. Then private consumption of husbands is
cm = φ(Em, Ef , wm, wf , y)
and that of wives is
cf = wmhm + wfhf + y − φ(Em, Ef , wm, wf , y).43
Husbands and wives, therefore, share household income according to the shar-
ing rule, a function φ(.). Private consumption is subjected to budget constraint,
cm + cf = I and defined to be positive, ci ≥ 0. The sharing rule φ(.) same as in
Chiappori (2002) denotes the resource transferred among couples.
2.2.3 Individual Optimization
Assume that individual utilities depend on their private consumptions and
leisure. Private consumption of couples, cm and cf , rely on couples’ income (wm, wf , y)
and their sharing rule φ. Finally, the individual utility maximization is shown as
below.
max
{cti,lti}
∑
βtui(c
t
i, l
t
i)
s.t. ctm = φ(E
t
m, E
t
f , w
t
m, w
t
f , y
t)
ctf = w
t
mh
t
m + w
t
fh
t
f + y
t − φ(Etm, Etf , wtm, wtf , yt)
lti = 1− hti
where cti is the individual private consumption, l
t
i ∈ [0, 1] is the time spent on leisure.
Note that under the dynamic setting, individual decision of working or not is based
not only on their expectation of future income, but also their current consumption –
the share of household income determined by their employment status. With this in
mind, we next consider the value function in equilibrium.
2.2.4 Value Function
In this subsection, we describe the value function of couples given their state
variables. Consider an individual i, i = m, f , in a household where husband has the
wage at the value of wm and wife has wf .
Each spouse i has private consumptions ci by sharing part of non-labor in-
come y and the transfer from spousal wage income w−i. The private consumption is
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determined by the sharing rule, which as a decision rule of family is contingent on
employment status and wage earnings of couples.
We define {W i(wm, wf ), i = m, f} as the value function of married couples i,
where wm stands for husband’s wage and wf is that of wife. Decision rule of husband
working, Dm(w
′, wf ), is a function of his wife’s wage wf and his job offer w′.
Dm(w
′, wf ) =
{
1,work if Wm(w′, wf ) ≥ Wm(0, wf );
0, otherwise.
The decision rule of wife is
Df (wm, w
′′) =
{
1, if W f (wm, w
′′) ≥ W f (wm, 0);
0, otherwise.
Value function differs by couples’ employment status. In total, there exist
four combinations of states: {both unemployed (0, 0), husband employed but wife not
employed (wm, 0), wife employed but husband not employed (0, wf ), both employed
(wm, wf )} as in table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Available States for Couples
Wife workWife not work
Husband work (wm, wf ) (wm, 0)
Husband not work (0, wf ) (0, 0)
Husbands and wives in our model play a Nash game in deciding dynamic
labor supply. Here we take the case of wife being employed but husband not, (0, wf ),
as an example to discuss the process of husbands decision-making. The timing of
husband decision is also displayed in figure 2.1. The husband utility given that his
private consumption is cm and leisure is lm, is a function of husbands and wives’
income. That is, um(cm, lm) = um(cm(0, wf ), lm(0, wf )) = um(0, wf ). Husband sets
the criteria to accept wage offer – reservation wage – based on his rational expectation
of the future job opportunity and the expected response of his wife.
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Figure 2.1: Timing of Husband Employment Decision when Wives with Wage wf
Case (1) If the wife loses her job (with Pr = δf ) and he is offered a job (with
Pr = λm), the husband will set his reservation wage based on the status that his
wife is unemployed; he will accept an offer w′ if and only if it is above his reservation
wage Rm(0), where Rm(0) denotes the husband’s reservation wage when his wife is
not working. Then with probability δfλm, his utility is∫
Rm(0)
Wm(w′m, 0)dF (w
′
m) +
∫ Rm(0)
Wm(0, 0)dF (w′m).
Case (2) If the wife loses her job at δf , the husband has no offer at (1− λm).
Then both of them are unemployed. His future utility is Wm(0, 0), with probability
δf (1− λm)
Case (3) If the wife does not lose her job and her husband gets an offer, the
husband will consider the possible response from his wife: will she quit the current
job or remain employed? Then he will set his reservation wage as a function of his
wife’s possible employment status and her wage rate. With probability (1 − δf )λm,
the husband’s utility is
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∫
Rm(wf )
Wm(w′m, wf )dF (w
′
m) +
∫ Rm(wf )
Wm(0, wf )dF (w
′
m).
If he expects his wife will not quit the current job, that is wf ≥ Rf (0, 0), where
Rm(wf ) denotes the husband’s reservation wage when his wife works with wage wf
and Rf (0) the wife’s reservation wage when her husband is not working.
Otherwise his utility is∫
Rm(0)
Wm(w′m, 0)dF (w
′
m) +
∫ Rm(0)
Wm(0, 0)dF (w′m)
Case (4) If the wife does not lose her job at (1 − δf ) and her husband has
no offer (1− λm), they will stick to their current jobs. His utility is Wm(0, wf ) with
probability (1− δf )(1− λm).
Finally, summing up all the possible outcomes of wife currently employed but
husband not, we obtain the value function of husband as below.
Wm(0, wf ) = um(0, wf ) + β{δfλm(
∫
Rm(0)
Wm(w′m, 0)dF (w
′
m)
+
∫ Rm(0)
Wm(0, 0)dF (w′m))
+δf (1− λm)Wm(0, 0) + (1− δf )λm(
(wf ≥ Rf (0))[
∫
Rm(wf )
Wm(w′m, wf )dF (w
′
m) +
∫ Rm(wf )Wm(0, wf )dF (w′m)]
+(wf < Rf (0))
∫
Rm(0)
Wm(w′m, 0)dF (w
′
m) +
∫ Rm(0)Wm(0, 0)dF (w′m)
)
+(1− δf )(1− λm)((wf ≥ Rf (0))Wm(0, wf ) + (wf < Rf (0))Wm(0, 0)))}
Similarly, we get the value functions of the rest of three other states: { both
unemployed, husband employed but wife not employed, both employed}, which are
displayed in appendix D. By the symmetry of husbands and wives, wives also have a
similar set of value functions.
2.2.5 Equilibrium
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An equilibrium is characterized by a set of reservation wages for husbands
and wives contingent on their spousal wage. The decision rules for each spouse
{Rm(·), Rf (·)} satisfy the cut-off rule.
W f (0, 0) = W f (0, Rf (0)); (2.1)
Wm(0, 0) = Wm(Rm(0), 0); (2.2)
W f (wm, 0) = W
f (wm, Rf (wm)); (2.3)
Wm(0, wf ) = W
m(Rm(wf ), wf ). (2.4)
{Ri(w−i), i,−i = m, f} denotes the offered wage that individual i is willing to
accept and work full-time given spousal wage being at the rate of w−i. Note that the
value functions {Wm(·, ·),W f (·, ·)} are defined as in the section of value function.
Compared with the individual job search, taking equation (3) as an example,
the reservation wage of wife makes her indifferent between working with wage Rf (wm)
and being unemployed. What makes wife decision different from singles is that with
the spouse present, her value function thus depends on the spousal wage. So instead
of a reservation wage in individual job search, wife has a reservation function of her
spousal wage.
The complexity of our model lies in endogenous decision of household labor
supply, in which family members not only make individual decisions but also bargain
over private consumption determined by their labor market performance. A simple
close-form solution might not be easy to obtain. Therefore, in the coming section, we
are to look into the properties of equilibrium by numerical methods.
2.2.6 Numerical Analysis of Equilibrium: A Simplified Example
To catch the feature of our model and perceive some properties of equilibrium,
I start with numerical analysis on a simplified version of household model.
48
We start with simplifying the original model. Instead of the original sharing
rule φ as a function of couples labor market status such as wages and employment
status, I let the private consumption shared by husbands, ψ, be a fraction of household
income. This example focuses on family Nash game in labor supply by simplifying the
bargaining. It aims to study individualized household decisions without bargaining.
We will discuss later that some important features remains even after simplifying the
original sharing rule.
So we have
cm = ψI = ψ(wm + wf + y),
cf = (1− ψ)I = (1− ψ)(wm + wf + y).
Letting in utility function {ui(ci, li)}i=m,f the consumption and leisure are
separable and addictive. With constant elasticity of substitution (CES) with risk
aversion γi=m,f , individual utility from consumption has u(ci) =
c
1−γi
i
1−γi . And utility
from leisure is v(li) = log(li). The weighting index of consumption over leisure,
{αi=m,f}, is set between 0 and 1. Larger the weighting index, less preference geared
toward leisure over consumption. For each individual i, the individual optimization
problem is
max
{cti,lti}
∑
βtui(c
t
i, l
t
i)
s.t. ui(c
t
i, l
t
i) = αi
c1−γii
1− γi + (1− αi)logli
ctm = ψ(E
t
m, E
t
f , w
t
m, w
t
f , y
t)
ctf = w
t
mh
t
m + w
t
fh
t
f + y
t − ψ(Etm, Etf , wtm, wtf , yt)
lti = 1− hti
where the disutility of working is given in log format, γ is risk aversion, c the individual
private consumption, l ∈ [0, 1] the time spent on leisure and I the household income.
And the weighting index of consumption over leisure, {αi=m,f} could vary by gender.49
This baseline model aim to improve our understand the properties of equi-
librium. Some important features remain even after simplifying the original sharing
rule.
Next, numerical analysis is made on the reservation function for several specific
sceneries. The detailed algorithm of numerical process is given in appendix E, and
the constants used are listed in table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Constants
Constant Description Value
β Time Discount Factor .996
λ Job Arrival Rate .4
δ Job Destruction Rate .004
2.2.6.1 Symmetric Couples: Income Effect Dominates
First, we consider that couples are perfectly symmetric: identical log-normal
wage offer distribution with {µi,j, σi,j}, identical offer arrival rates {αm = αf}. Most
importantly of all, household income is equally split between husbands and wives,
ψ = .5, suggesting no bargaining within a family. Let the risk averse parameter equal
one, γ = 1. The reservation wages of couples being a function of spousal wage are
displayed in figure 2.2.
When husbands and wives are set to be identical in individual preferences and
private consumption, the reservation wage they set are expected to be symmetric.
And without intrahousehold bargaining, the income effect dominates. So if the spouse
is employed, individual reservation wage is symmetric for husbands and wives, and it
is an increasing function of spousal wage. These predictions agree with our outcomes
from figure 2.2: if spouses earn more, individuals set higher reservation wages.
To further illustrate our model prediction and explore the increasing trend of
reservation function, we compare the reservation function for risk averse wives and
50
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
7
7.5
8
8.5
Same preferences for both gender, sr=.5
Husbands
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
7
7.5
8
8.5
Spouse Wage
R
es
er
va
tio
n 
W
ag
e
Wives
Figure 2.2: Reservation Wage of Both Genders. The upper chart is for Husbands and
lower is for wives. The horizontal axis is spousal wage level, and the vertical axis is
reservation wage.
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risk neutral ones. In particular, for those risk averse γ is set to be 1, but for risk
neutral ones γ is 0.
As shown in figure 2.3, for the risk-neutral individuals (γ = 0, in dash line),
their reservation function is a flat line of spousal wage; yet, for those risk averse (γ > 0,
in solid line), their reservation function is an increasing function of spousal wage. This
comparison demonstrates that it is individual risk aversion – the risk sharing within
a family – plays a central role in producing the upward slopping reservation function.
The income effect of second earner is supported by the assumption of individuals
being risk averse. This is consistent with the Danish study of wives by Lentz and
Trans (2005) that wives experience a longer unemployment duration if husbands earn
more.
Figure 2.3: Comparison of Reservation Functions for Individuals: Risk Averse vs.
Risk Neutral.
Wage earnings of the spouse at least partly insures the potential earner against
unemployment risk. In addition, non-labor income (including wealth earnings and
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home production) reinforces the income effect. So unemployed individuals afford to
set a higher reservation wage. Given all else the same, they will experience a longer
unemployment spell since a higher reservation wage is set. This upward-sloping trend
of reservation function is consistent with our intuition that family functions as an
insurance and it provides financial support and security.
2.2.6.2 Asymmetric Couples
We realize that the assumption of couples being symmetric and splitting house-
hold income equally are too simple to reveal family internal decision. It needs to be
relaxed.
In this section, without complicating this problem by introducing intrahouse-
hold bargaining, we extend the simplest example to asymmetric couples in two di-
mensions: different preferences for leisure, and different income allocation within a
family. We will see later that even without bargaining between couples, household
members are responsive to the changing preferences and household income allocation.
A. More Preference Towards Leisure, Lower Reservation Wage In-
dividuals Set.
Here our model shows how the change of couples preferences in leisure αm and
αf affects the reservation function. Figure 2.4 points out that, when more weight is
put on leisure, that is, the weighting index of consumption over leisure αm is larger,
husbands will value leisure less, and have a lower reservation wage – they are more
motivated to work.
We observe here the income effect on the reservation function same as in the
previous sections. Note that this extension shows that even without intrafamily bar-
gaining, the different preferences towards leisure between husbands and wives make
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Figure 2.4: Reservation Function Given Varying Weighting Index of husbands Pref-
erence of Leisure Over Consumption: the effect of α changes on reservation wage.
them different in reservation wages.
B. More Income Shared, More Likely to Work
We let the portion of income shared by husbands, ψ, vary from .5 to .47
and .53, respectively. It examines the effect of the simplified intra-household income
distribution, ψ, on husbands’ reservation wages.
Figure 2.5 reveals that, with the fractions of household income distributed to
husbands ψ rising from 47% to 53%, the more income is shared by husbands and
the lower the reservation wage husbands set. The reason is that, the more income
is shared more by husbands, they are more willing to work, even at a relative lower
wage.
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Figure 2.5: Reservation Function Given Varying Income Shared by Husbands: the
effect of ψ changes on the shift of reservation wage.
2.2.7 Confronting Data
To quantify the sharing rule–intrahousehold bargaining, we next bring in data
and estimate the original model instead of the simplified ones.
This discussion highlights some key components of married individual labor
supply decisions and their sharing within the family. Our goal is to use household
search model to analyze the impact of sharing rule on dynamic family labor supply
decisions. By matching with data, we can recover the decision rules as well as the
sharing rule, and further examine family job search pattern in the U.S..
Since individual-level consumption data is not available, direct calibration of
private consumption and further the sharing rule is not feasible. The sharing rule
is derived from dynamic household labor supply by estimation model with the real
data. With these in mind, we first turn to a description of the U.S. household data
and then to the estimation of our richer model.
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2.3 Data
2.3.1 The Sample
To estimate model, the year 2001 panel data of Survey and Income Program
Participation (SIPP 2001) are used. SIPP data provide accurate and comprehensive
information about principal determinants of income and program participation of
individuals within households in the United States. In SIPP 2001, individuals from
primary households are interviewed every 4 months for 9 consecutive waves, which
sum up to a 3-year panel data. Interviewed individuals are asked about their monthly
information on employment status, job earnings, working hours per week and weeks
worked per month. Therefore, information on job change and unemployment duration
on a monthly basis can be derived from data.
The advantages of SIPP data are as follows: (1) panel data track dynamic
labor supply records and unemployment duration; (2) 3-year panel is short enough
so structural changes are less likely to occur on social institutions and individual
preferences, and 4-month visit interval gives more reliable records on a monthly basis
than yearly in PSID data; (3) symmetric information is available for husbands and
wives, so couples’ employment information is collected; (4) large original sample size
make it possible to obtain a sizable target sample.
In summary, SIPP data give sufficient information on household labor supply
and wage earnings from 2001 to 2003, and provide testable restrictions that are used
to recover private consumption of each spouse.
We focus on white couples. The criteria that I apply to restrict data are
described in appendix F. If any spouse within a household fails to satisfy the restric-
tions, this household is excluded. After imposing all the restrictions, the sample is
left with 2297 households.
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2.3.2 Descriptive Statistics
In our sample, 60.9% of husbands have college degree and so do 65.1% of wives.
Wives with high school diplomas, on average have hourly pay rate at 14.18 in 2001
dollar; meanwhile, wives with college diplomas, on average have hourly rate at 20.65.
For working husbands, the average hourly rate of those with high school diplomas is
16.94, and with college diplomas is 25.49. On average, college graduates husbands
earn $8.50 more than high school graduates per hour; college graduates wives have
a smaller gap and earn $6.50 more than their peers of high school graduates. Table
2.3 gives the mean and standard error of hourly wages of couples and their education
level, respectively.
Table 2.3: Education and Wage Information for Both Genders
Husband Wife
Education Level HighGrad College HighGrad College
% of Total Population 39.1 60.9 34.9 65.1
Hourly Wage for Those Work
Mean 16.94 25.49 14.18 20.65
Std. Err. (13.26) (17.32) (16.46) (18.68)
2001 Dollar Value
Table 2.4: Employment Rates for Husbands and Wives
(%) Husband Wife
Unemployment Rate 3.14 13.68
Employment Rate if Spouse Working 97.12 86.55
Fraction of Full Time if Employed 98.15 73.11
Fraction of Working Full-Time if Spouse also FT 97.97 72.84
Values are given by percentage.
As in SIPP, individuals are working full-time if hours they worked
are more than 35 hours and otherwise part-time.
Table 2.4 presents the fraction of sample population who get employed. 3.14%
of husbands are currently unemployed, compared to 13.68% of wives who are unem-
ployed. If employed, the probability of husbands working full-time is 98.15%, while
that of wives is 73.11%.
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If one’s spouse is employed, 97.12% of husbands and 86.55% of wives are also
working, respectively. Particularly, if the spouse is working full-time, the fraction of
husbands working full-time increases to 97.97%, but working wives have full-time jobs
decreases to 72.84. add in comments.
Table 2.5 pools unemployment duration of husbands and wives. It shows that
around 78% of unemployed husbands get employed after 12 months, however, 60%
of unemployed wives remain not employed. The survival rate of being unemployed
declined over time, and it drops to 13.92% for husbands and to 48.38% for wives.
Meanwhile, the transition rate from unemployment to full-time jobs is increas-
ing along time. Obvious asymmetry is observed between husbands and wives: after
20 months, around half of once-unemployed husbands are settled with full-time jobs,
and so are only 6% wives.
Table 2.5: Transition Rate of Unemployment
(%) Husband Wife
k Prob(Ut|Ut+k) Prob(Ut|FTt+k) Prob(Ut|Ut+k) Prob(Ut|FTt+k)
1 81.39 17.12 93.21 3.15
2 64.74 18.16 87.08 3.26
3 50.06 19.20 81.50 3.44
4 36.70 20.39 76.52 3.58
5 32.54 20.98 73.61 3.68
6 29.50 21.78 70.92 3.82
7 26.63 22.49 68.69 3.96
8 24.14 23.42 66.60 4.12
9 23.11 23.96 64.83 4.29
10 22.83 25.09 63.26 4.53
11 23.06 26.55 61.79 4.76
12 23.46 28.27 60.50 5.00
13 22.50 28.80 59.13 4.91
14 21.73 30.28 57.64 5.14
15 20.64 32.62 56.17 5.42
16 19.85 35.74 54.76 5.64
17 18.79 35.35 53.28 5.61
18 17.42 37.80 51.92 5.86
19 15.46 40.27 50.34 6.34
20 13.92 43.46 48.38 6.64
k gives monthly intervals from time t.
First two columns give unemployment duration of couples and the last two
columns are transition rates from unemployment to full-time jobs.
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2.4 Estimation
To recover individual decision rules, in this section we estimate the original
model with data SIPP 2001. The sharing rule is a function of couples’ wages and
non-labor income as in Chiappori (1998, 2002).
φ(wm, wf , y) = a0 + a1wm + a2 logwf + a3y,
where wm are husbands’ wage earnings, wf are that of wives and y is the exogenous
non-labor family income. We directly use the level of male wage earnings to nest out
the income pooling hypothesis.
We define the sharing rule is in the form of semi-log specification, not only
because it is a popular form to use seen in Blundell, Duncan and Meghir (1998),
also also because this form is never rejected by the previous data work of Chiappori
(1998, 2002). So we take this form as a starting point to study the intra-household
bargaining.
2.4.1 Constant Setting
Table 2.6: Some Basic Indices for Married Couples
Variables Value
Average Age Gap 1.70
Average Weeks Worked per Month if Employed 4.33
Average Hours Worked if Part Time Working 20.8
Average Hours Worked if Full Time Working 44.3
Correlation of Hourly Wage for Husband and Wife .2248
The household in our sample have an average age gap of 1.7 years between
couples, which justifies our selection criteria of 2-year age gap between husbands and
wives. As in the SIPP data, individuals are defined to work full-time if hours they
worked per week are more than 35, and part-time if hours worked per week are less
than 35 hours. Our sample have on average hours worked full-time are 44.3 and part-
time are 20.8. So in estimation, instead of continuous working hours, employment
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status is categorized to be either employed part-time or full-time or not working.
Assume that the per week endowed time is 80 hours. Working part-time is defined
as working hours hpt =
22.8
80
= .28, and working full-time hft =
44.3
80
= .54. And then
leisure enjoyed of not working is 1.
The correlation of couples’ hourly wage if both work is positive with the value
.2248, suggesting the positive assortative mating, which we use as a moment to indi-
cate the interaction of couples’ decisions.
The wage-related constants used for estimation are listed in table 2.7.
Table 2.7: Constants
Constant Description Value
Accepted hourly wage for husband by education
µm,h high school graduate 16.94
σm,h (13.26)
µm,c at least college graduate 25.492
σm,c (17.32)
Accepted hourly wage for wife by education
µf,h high school graduate 14.18
σf,h (16.46)
µf,c at least college graduate 20.65
σf,c (18.68)
2.4.2 Estimation Strategy: Simulated Method of Moments
We start with characterizing the underlying economic environments (offer ar-
rival rates, preferences, departure rates, sharing rule, etc.) through a vector of pa-
rameters θ. Given a set of θ, we solve the individual optimization problem by the
dynamic programming. By aggregating across all the heterogeneous individuals in
our economy, we can generate the simulated variables as model predictions to match
with those observed variables from data.
Using simulated method of moments, I estimate parameter vector θ by match-
ing simulated moments with sample moments. The estimated parameters aim to
minimize the distance between a set of simulated moments and sample moments, and
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bring them as close as possible.
min
θ
(ψd − ψs(θ))′WT−1(ψd − ψs(θ))
where ψd are sample moments, and ψs(θ) are the simulated moments from model
conditional on a set of parameters, θ. WT is the optimal weighting matrix that
accounts for the scale differences of moments, and it places greater weights to moments
with less variance. The algorithm of estimation is described in appendix E.
2.4.3 Econometric Specification
So our model is characterized by a vector of parameters.
θ = (λft, λpt, αm, αf , γ, δm, δf , a0, a1, a2, a3, Da).
Wage offer is drawn from a log-normal distribution with mean µi,j and standard error
σi,j, where {µi,j, σi,j} denotes the mean and standard error of wage offer distribu-
tion for spouse i ∈ {m, f} with education level j ∈ {high school graduate, college
graduate}. The wage offer distribution differs by gender and education as in table
2.7.
Job offer arrival rates {λk, k = ft, pt} define a Poisson process for full-time
and part-time jobs. Spousal i preference of consumption over leisure is characterized
by the weighting index {αi, i = m, f}, and γ denotes the risk aversion in the form of
Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES). And {δk, k = m, f} give job destruction
rates of men and women, respectively.
a0 − a3 define the sharing rule that the income allocated to husbands for con-
sumption as a function of wage incomes and non-labor income as in Chiappori (2002).
And Da give the depreciation rate of the income-related coefficients if husbands not
working.
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Finally, the moments we used for estimation relating to employment rates and
wages correlation are presented as in table 2.8. Identification issues are discussed in
appendix G.
Table 2.8: Moments from Data
Moment Value
% of unemployed husband .0314
% of unemployed wife .1368
% of employed husbands if wives employed .9712
% of employed wives if husbands employed .8655
% of full-time husbands if wives employed full-time .9797
% of full-time wives if husbands employed full-time .7284
% of full-time working husband if employed .9811
% of full-time working wife if employed .7311
% of working husband get unemployed in 5 periods .0167
% of working wife get unemployed in 5 periods .0345
% husbands remain not employed after 5 periods .3754
% wives remain not employed after 5 periods .7361
% husbands full-time employed after 5 periods from unemployment .2098
% wives full employed after 5 periods from unemployment .0368
Wage Correlation between husbands and wives .2248
2.5 Results and Discussion
2.5.1 The Estimates
This section discusses the estimated results and their economic interpretations.
In total we have 15 moments from data and 11 parameters to estimate.
The simulated moments compared to sample moments is presented in table
2.9. It depicts the fitness of model. Moreover, the t-statistics of estimates indicates
that model predictions are significant, and estimates are quite close for moments.
Table 2.10 contains the estimates of parameters. Overall, our model matches
closely between simulated moments and sample moments and most estimates are
significant at the 5% level.
Offer arrival rate for full-time jobs, λft, is .3731; and for part-time job, λft,
is .1966. This means on average every three months unemployed people have one
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Table 2.9: Estimation Results
Sample Moment Simulated Moment
% of unemployed husband .0314 .0348
% of unemployed wife .1368 .1266
% of employed husbands if wives employed .9712 .9687
% of employed wives if husbands employed .8655 .8867
% of full-time husbands if wives employed full-time .9797 .9642
% of full-time wives if husbands employed full-time .7284 .7394
% of full-time working husband if employed .9811 .9510
% of full-time working wife if employed .7311 .7357
% of working husband get unemployed in 5 periods .0167 .0147
% of working wife get unemployed in 5 periods .0345 .0233
% husbands remain not employed after 5 periods .3754 .4297
% wives remain not employed after 5 periods .7361 .7741
% husbands full-time employed after 5 periods from unemployment .2098 .1787
% wives full employed after 5 periods from unemployment .0368 .0484
Wage Correlation between husbands and wives .2248 .2344
Within the parentheses are standard deviations of hourly wage respectively.
Table 2.10: Parameters Estimates
Parameter Definition Estimated Value Standard Error
λft offer arrival rate for full-time job .3731 .0008
λpt offer arrival rate for part-time job .1966 .0010
αm Husbands preference for consumption over leisure .1540 .0003
αf Wives preference .1523 .0007
γ Risk Aversion Index 1.3133 .0040
δm Job Destruction Rate for Husbands .0041 .0000
δm Job Destruction Rate for Wives .0038 .0000
Parameter estimates are from data SIPP 2001.
Assume that time discount factor is .996 on a monthly basis.
full-time offer; every five months there comes one part-time offer. The risk aversion
is 1.3133 with standard error .004.
As to individual preference of consumption over leisure, the weighting index
for husbands, αm, is .1540, greater than that of wives αf with the value of .1523, while
the standard error are .0003 and .0007, respectively. We next test the null hypothesis
that husbands and wives have the same preferences over leisure.
H0 : αm − αf = 0, or, αm − αf ≤ 0,
H1 : αm − αf ≥ 0,
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since the t value
αm − αf√
s2αm
nm
+
s2αf
nf
=
.1540− .1523√
s2.0003
nm
+
s2.0007
nf
= 20.3119
is greater than t-statistics t∞,.05 = 1.645, the null hypothesis is rejected. That is,
husbands and wives have different priority for leisure and wives prefer leisure.
Table 2.11: Sharing Rule φ(wm, wf , y) = a0+(Em+(1−Em)Da)(a1wm+a2 logwf+a3y)
Coefficient of Definition Estimated Value Standard Error
Quasi- Sharing Rule
a0 constant 12.0805 .0189
a1 husband wage .5097 .0011
a2 of wife employment -1.9257 .0038
a3 if both employed .5426 .0005
Da Depreciation of Unemployed Husbands .8201 .0007
Employment status of husbands Em is 1 when employed and 0 otherwise.
The sharing rule, φ(wm, wf , y), gives the proportion of household income used
by husband for private consumption as in table 2.11. If husbands are working, the
sharing rule is in the form of the equation below.
φ(wm, wf , y) = 12.0805 + .5097wm− .1981 logwf + .5426y. (2.5)
(.0189) (.0011) (.0038) (.0005)
But if husbands are not working, we have
φ(wm, wf , y) = 12.0805 + .8201 (.5097wm− .1981 logwf + .5425y). (2.6)
(.0007)
At the 5% level, the estimates of sharing rule are significant. Here wm and
wf are wage earnings of husbands and wives. From equation (2.5), higher husbands
wage earnings, more private consumption they enjoy. One percent rise in husbands’
wages raises .51 percent of their private consumption. But when wives earns more,
more money is shared by wives.
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Finally, we discuss the bargaining aspects within household. As shown in
table 2.11, if husbands work, around 54% of household other income is consumed
by husbands, and husbands transfer the rest of non-labor income to their wives. If
husbands do not work, as in equation (2.6), they take only 45% of the other income.
This difference implies that the non-labor income shared by husbands is re-
sponsive to his employment status. This partly explains why husbands are more
likely to work. Ignoring the intra-household income distribution between husbands
and wives, we could make misleading remarks.
2.5.2 Overidentification Test
The number of moments, 15, is larger than that of parameters to estimate, 12.
So our model is over-identified. Only 12 moments are required to just identify the
vector of parameters, therefore, the remaining restrictions are used to evaluate this
model. Under the null hypothesis of the model being the true one, the added moments
are supposed to be closed to the true value of parameters. The overidentification test
is specified as below.
T (ψd − ψs(θ))′WT−1(ψd − ψs(θ))→ χ2(15− 12).
In practice, we get the computed criterion function at the estimated parameters, 6.99,
is less than a chi-square critical value 7.81 at the 5% significance level. So the null
hypothesis is not rejected.
2.6 Implication of Sharing Rule: Back to SIPP 2001 Data
In this section, we further explore the implication of the recovered sharing
rule. Assume yf is the money transfer from husbands to wives, that is,
yf = wm − cm = wm − φ
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. The money transfer from husbands to wives is therefore equal to
yf = wm − (a0 + (Em + (1− Em)Da)(a1wm + a2 logwf + a3y))
= −a0 + (1− (Em + (1− Em)Da)a1)wm
−(Em + (1− Em)Da)(a2 logwf + a3y).
The monthly transfer from husbands to wives, based on estimation in our
sample, is $1355.30 in 2001 dollar with standard error being $2292.21.
The female labor supply implied by the estimates is
hf = −.5472 +.1981 logwf− .000024 yf .
(.0094) (.0012) (6.14e− 7)
where hf ∈ [0, 1] and hf = 1 if working full-time, wf are wages of wives.
All the three estimates are significant at the 1% level. As we have expected,
the coefficient of other income of wives has a negative sign, suggesting the income
effect. Higher wage increases the hours worked. The implied wage elasticity is 0.57.
Also the implied participation frontiers are
wm∗ = 2.8637+ .2614 logwf − . 0085 yf .
(.3058) (.0403) (.0002)
Then we make the derivative of husband reservation wage over that of wives
to further analyze the incentive of wives’ wage onto husbands within the family.
∂wm∗
∂wf
= .2614
1
wf
− .0085 ∂yf
∂wf
= .2614
1
wf
− .0085(−Daa2 1
wf
) =
.2600
wf
> 0
If wives have higher wages, husbands tend to hold higher reservation wages.
More money husbands transfer to their wives, lower reservation wage they set.
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2.7 Conclusion
Overwhelming majority of research on household labor supply ignored the
bargaining among couples. This simplification, though convenient, causes endogeneity
issue, especially for household job search decision. This chapter builds up a structural
model to simulate the dynamic household labor supply decisions, and provides an
empirical alternative to deal with this complex problem.
Our recovered sharing rule shows that, higher male wage earning and lower
female earnings and more non-labor income, husbands consume more. The most
notable result is that, husbands share of household income is responsive to their
employment status: when husbands work, they take away 54% of household other
income; but when they do not work, they are left with only 45% of other income.
Husbands private consumption shrink to around 82% of their original amount when
they are working. This sensitivity of husbands consumption to employment status
shows the existence of bargaining within a family.
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Chapter 3
Intrahousehold Bargaining and Gender
Asymmetry in Household Unemployment Duration
3.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the household unemployment duration in the U.S.
The literature on individual-level unemployment duration is rich. Several empir-
ical work used structural search models to study the individual search behaviors
as in Yoon (1981), Lancaster (1979), Lancaster and Chesher (1983), Lynch (1983),
Narendranathan and Nickell (1985), Wolpin (1987), Pissarides (1982) and Burdett
(1979). So is the thereafter research of unemployment insurance, which is based on
the individual-level theoretical framework as in Meyer (1990), Katz and Meyer(1990 I
and 1990 II), Gibbons and Katz (1991). Household unemployment duration, however,
is comparatively not thoroughly studied.
Our question is, for those married, does the spousal wage affect their job
search and unemployment spells? The importance of looking into this issue lies in
the following. If household search decisions can be simplified to two independent
individuals, then we are safe to work with this question. Otherwise, household job
search might deviate from the standard individual search model. In this case, studying
of unemployment duration need further scrutiny. With this in mind, we need to study
whether husbands and wives share the same pattern in job search.
Ahn and Ugidos-Olazabal (1995) mentioned that in Spain household heads
have twice larger job-finding probability than non-heads, and having other working
household members improves employment probability, suggesting that family connec-
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tions in the labor market are important determinants of unemployment duration.
Danish data, as claimed in Lentz and Trans (2005), show a gender asymmetry
in job search. That is, if husbands earn more, wives experience a longer unemployment
duration; but if wives earn more, husbands find jobs sooner. There arises a natural
question – does this pattern also apply to the U.S.? We realize that empirical tests of
the household unemployment duration requires a sizable observation of unemployment
spells for both husbands and wives, which is hard to guarantee based on the available
survey data in the U.S.. This chapter provides an alternative to this problem.
Our strategy is as follows. First we build up a household search model, and
after parameterization with SIPP 2001 data we could recover household decision rules.
Using estimated underlying economic environments and individual decision rules, we
simulate a sizable observations of unemployment spells that are finally used to derive
the pattern of the U.S. couples in job search.
The main contribution of this chapter is three-fold. (1) This work fills in
the existing gap on household job search. Until now most studies pertaining to job
search are addressed at the individual level, while the majority of the empirical work
is based on household data. The discrepancy between individual-level search theory
and household-level data invokes needs to study a household search model.
Flinn (2006) and Mabli (2006) examined the dynamic household labor supply
in the form of household utility. What distinguishes our work from theirs is the use of
individual utility. This chapter relaxes the traditional assumption of household utility
and introduces intra-household bargaining between husbands and wives through the
collective model.
Research on intra-household allocation, in microeconomics, is quite rich. Chi-
appori (1992), Browning and Chiappori (1994, 1998) proposed the collective model,
in which multiple agents in household are characterized by their own preferences, and
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consumption of each spouse is the outcomes of bargaining. The traditional treatment
of household as a decision unit represented by the household header, though attractive
and convenient, failed in family internal decision as mentioned in Chiappori (1992,
1998). In this chapter we adopt the collective framework, letting the sharing rule be
husbands private consumption. Under this framework I build up a discrete household
search model. To the best of my knowledge, it is the first model to study dynamic
couples Nash game in labor supply.
(2) This search model is adequate for empirical estimation at the household
level. The household decision rules and sharing rule that we recovered support the ex-
istence of the bargaining between husbands and wives, and show how intra-household
bargaining affects household labor supply decisions. In the past literature the diffi-
culty of empirical tests come from two aspects. One aspect is the endogeneity issue.
Under dynamic setting, intra-household distribution – the share of household income
distributed to husbands and wives – depends on couples’ employment status and
earnings. Moreover, decisions of labor supply depend on intra-household bargaining
and wage offered. The other aspect is, the available data contain limited informa-
tion on intra-household income allocation because private consumption of husbands
and wives is mostly unobservable. In addition, panel data at the household level are
required to track household job search. The unobserved consumption data together
with endogenous dynamic decisions make this task intractable.
In estimation by Simulated Methods of Moment (SMM), we use a set of key
parameters to describe the underlying economic environment and individual decisions
such as arrival rate and the sharing rule. Given one set of parameters, we simulate
a group of variables on household employment transition and realized wage. Our
goal is to find the set of parameters so that the simulated variables are as close as
possible to those variables from SIPP data. This approach efficiently utilizes the
available survey data of labor market performance, and enables further empirical
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tests on intra-household allocation.
(3) We derive the job search behaviors of the U.S. couples. Using the empirical
estimation of dynamic household labor supply, and the sharing rule – the compro-
mised decision of married couples – we simulate a sizable observations of household
unemployment spells that mimic the original data. Semiparametric estimation tech-
niques as in Meyer (1990) are used to derive the pattern of household unemployment
duration.
Our results reveal that, husbands consumption is sensitive to their employment
status. If husbands are working, they take 54% of non-labor income, but unemployed
husbands suffer a loss in the share of household income and his share falls to 45%
of non-labor income. This difference indicates the existence of bargaining between
husbands and wives. The social norm that men are breadwinners could explain the
decrease of the bargaining power of husbands.
We also find that on average the monthly transfer from husbands to wives is
$1355. The recovered women labor supply indicates that higher women wage and
lower share from family raises women labor supply, suggesting that for wives, the
income effect dominates their labor supply decisions. Meanwhile, the wage frontier
of husbands are positively correlated to wives wages and negatively correlated to the
transfer to wives, meaning that husbands decisions are subject to both income effect
and intrahousehold bargaining.
Finally, the calculated household unemployment duration shows that when
husbands earn more, wives search longer for jobs; if wives earn more, the impact on
husbands unemployment duration is mixed. In particular, without controlling the
unobserved individual heterogeneity, husbands find jobs sooner.
The chapter is organized as follows. Directly applying the family decision rules
recovered in chapter 2, in section 2 we derive job search pattern of the U.S. couples
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and make conclusions in section 3.
3.2 Derive Unemployment Duration of the U.S. Couples
At the household level, unemployment duration based on the U.S. data is little
empirically tested. In SIPP 2001, we have come to a limited number of observation
for unemployed spells. It is large enough to recover the underlying economic envi-
ronments of our model, but not sufficient to directly conduct the empirical tests of
household unemployment duration.
Here we provides an alternative to this problem. Using the family decision
rules and sharing rule we recovered in chapter 2, we simulate a large size (n = 5000)
of data that mimic the property of SIPP 2001 sample. We realize that families
with different number of children and education level might differ in their decision
rules. But given that our sharing rule is recovered as that of the representative
family, our simulated data attempt to derive household unemployment duration for
the representative family in the U.S. Further work is required to study the sharing
rule for groups of families with different education level and number of children. And
I will leave this for the future work. So in this chapter, we derive the unemployment
duration of the U.S. couples from the simulated data.
3.2.1 Duration Model
To examine the impact of spousal wage on the hazard rate of unemployment
spells of individual workers, we use the estimation approach that is discussed in Meyer
(1986, 1990). The shape of the hazard is estimated nonparametrically. The hazard is
parameterized using a proportional hazards form.
Λi(t) = Λ0(t)e
zi
′b
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where Λ0(t) is the baseline hazard at time t, zi is a set of explanatory variables for
individual i, and b gives a vector of coefficients of explanatory variables.
The probability of a spell lasting until t+1 given that it lasts t periods already
is written as a function of hazard.
P [Ti ≥ t+ 1|Ti ≥ t] = e−e(zi′b+Γ(t)),
where
Γ(t) = ln(
∫ t+1
t
Λ0(u)du)
is unknown. Let ∆i = 1 if the unemployment spell is right censored and 0 otherwise,
and ki is the observed unemployment duration of individual i. As is discussed in
Meyer (1990), the corresponding log-likelihood function is now a function of Γ and
coefficient vector b.
L(Γ, b) =
N∑
i=1
[∆ilog(1− e−e(Γ(ki)+zi(ki)′b))−
ki−1∑
t=1
eΓ(t)+zi(t)
′b].
If we consider the unobserved heterogeneity, which is assumed to be indepen-
dent of explanatory variables zi, the hazard is
Λi(t) = ΘiΛ0(t)e
zi
′b,
where Θi is the unobserved heterogeneity. Assume that Θ follows the gamma distri-
bution with mean ones and variance Σ2 . By Prentice and Gloeckler (1978) model,
the likelihood function is
L(Γ, b,Σ) =
N∑
i=1
[−∆i(1 + Σ2
ki∑
t=0
eΓ(t)+zi(t)
′b) + (1 + Σ2
ki−1∑
t=0
eΓ(t)+zi(t)
′b)].
3.2.2 Results
Using Maximum Likelihood Estimation, we obtain the measures of coefficients
and Γ distribution. Besides education level and gender, spousal wage and the number
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Table 3.1: Hazard Model Estimates
Variables Without Unobserved With Unobserved
Heterogeneity Heterogeneity
Is Female .0069** .0038**
(.0027) (.0016)
College Graduate -.0664 -.0426
(.0601) (.0315)
Spousal Wage -.0011** .0002
(.0004) (.0022)
Number of Children (age ≤ 7) .0002 .0035
(.0017) (.0036)
Number of Children (age 7 ≤,≤ 18) -.0013 .0034
(.0067) (.0126)
Is Female × Spousal Wage .0029** .0086**
(.0007) (.0039)
Estimates of Σ .2207**
(.0037)
Controlling for No Yes
Unobserved Heterogeneity
Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
** Variables are 5% significant.
of children are included in the explanatory variables zi. The results for estimation
with and without heterogeneity are reported in table 3.1.
The coefficient of interaction of being female and spousal wage shows that for
wives, higher spousal wages increase the hazard. Using the coefficient estimates of
without heterogeneity, a 10 percent increase in spousal wage is associate with an .029
percent increase in the hazard.
Meanwhile, the estimate of being women is positive significantly at the value
of .0069 and .0038, respectively, suggesting that wives are more likely to endure a
longer unemployment.
The impact of spousal wage only is mixed. The coefficient of spousal wage,
using the specification of without unobserved heterogeneity, is at the value of -.0011.
This estimate is significant at the 5% level. It reveals that for husbands, on the con-
trary, higher spousal wages decrease the hazard and therefore husbands are expected
to find jobs sooner as their wives earn more.
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When wives’ wage increases by 10 percent, the hazard falls by .011 percent. For
wives, the total effect of spousal wage is at the value of .0018, the sum of coefficients
of both specifications −.0011 + .0029, suggesting that the increase in spousal wage
raises wives’ hazard rate. This is consistent with our former analysis of coefficient of
interaction item.
But using specification of including the unobserved heterogeneity of individuals
in our model, the estimates do not show that spousal wage is significant. So under
this setting, we are uncertain of the impact on husbands.
Overall, from the simulated data we find that in the U.S., higher spousal wage
increases the hazard of wives, and this effect is due to the insurance of spousal income
against unemployment risk, which makes it more affordable for wives to search longer
until they find a more desirable job with higher reservation wage. For wives, their
decisions are dominated by income effect.
However, the impact of spousal wage on husbands is mixed, and as far as we
study, it depends on the specifications. So both income effect and intrahousehold
bargaining take into effect. The final effect depends on which force dominates.
3.3 Conclusion and Future Work
Overwhelming majority of research on household labor supply ignored the
bargaining among couples. This simplification, though convenient, fails to deal with
the family internal decisions.
This chapter makes a theoretical contribution in constructing an individualized
household search model that fills in the existing gap between the individual-level
search model and the household-level data. We simulate the dynamic household labor
supply decisions, and provides an empirical alternative to study the unemployment
duration of the U.S. couples.
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Our recovered sharing rule shows that, the more husbands earn, the lower
wives earn and the more non-labor income that the family produces, husbands con-
sume more. The most notable result is that, husbands share of household income is
responsive to their employment status: when husbands work, they take away 54% of
household other income; but when they do not work, they are left with only 45% of
other income. Husbands private consumption shrink to around 82% of their original
amount when they are working. This sensitivity of husbands consumption to their
employment status reveals the existence of bargaining within a family.
By estimating the simulated data with maximum likelihood methods, our
study indicates that in the U.S. when husbands earn more, wives take a longer time
to find jobs. But the effect of spousal income on husbands unemployment duration
is mixed. Further study is needed to scrutinize this issue when home production are
considered.
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Appendix A
Reservation Value of Being Married
In this section, we present the process of men to obtain reservation value by
the cut-off rule that marrying to those with reservation value is equivalent to being
single.
Vm(w) = W (w,Rm),
= wRm/2+βδVm(w)
1−β(1−δ) ,
=⇒ wRm
1−β .
(A.1)
From the value function of being single, we have
Vm(w) =
w + βλm
∫ w¯m
Rm
W (w,w′)fw(w′)∆w,w′dw′
1− β + βλm
∫ w¯m
Rm
fw(w′)∆w,w′dw′.
(A.2)
Then we plug the above equation (A.2) into equation (A.1), we get
(1− β)Vm(w) + βλm
∫ w¯m
Rm
[Vm(w)− ww′+βδVm(w)1−β(1−δ) ]fw(w′)∆w,w′dw′ = w
=⇒
wRm/2 + βλm
∫ w¯m
Rm
w(Rm−w′)
1−β(1−δ) ]fw(w
′)∆w,w′dw′ = w
=⇒
Rm(w) = 2 +
βλm
1− β(1− δ)
∫ w¯m
Rm
(ww −Rm)fw(w′)∆w,w′dw′.
By symmetry, we could get the reservation function for women in the form as below.
Rw(w
′) = 2 +
βλw
1− β(1− δ)
∫ w¯m
Rw
(w −Rw)fm(w)∆w,w′dw
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Appendix B
Algorithm of Computing Steady State Equilibrium
(SSE)
We describe below the algorithm we use to compute the steady state equilib-
rium given a vector of parameters θ. Here the definition of parameter vector θ is same
as in the estimation section of empirical implementation.
1. Define a set of parameters θ,
θ = {λm, λw, δ, β, µ, σ}.
It provides the key economic environments such as arrival rate, divorce rate,
time discount factor and wage offer distribution.
2. Compute the reservation function of Nash Equilibrium (NE) for men and women
by finding solution to the below equations.
Rm(w) = 2 +
βλm
1− β(1− δ)
∫ w¯m
Rm
(ww −Rm)fw(w′)∆w,w′dw′,
Rw(w
′) = 2 +
βλw
1− β(1− δ)
∫ w¯m
Rw
(w −Rw)fm(w)∆w,w′dw.
• Randomly draw wage offer from log-normal distribution defined by {µi, σi}i=m,w.
log(wi) ∼ N(µi, σi).
So we generate f{wi}i=m,w(·) . In particular, we use the algorithm given in
Proposition 4.
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• Based on reservation wage equations from cut-off rules, we derive the
reservation function Rm(p) that is the solution of the function below.
0 = Rm(w)− 2− βλm
1− β(1− δ)
∫ w¯w
Rm
(ww −Rm)fw(ww)∆w,wwdww = 0.
Similarly I have for Rf (w).
3. Simulate the matching process given the reservation functions from Nash Equi-
librium.
• Simulate the offer of marriage arrival between [0, 1] for 5000 men and
women from time t=1 to t=500, so we get a matrix M in the size of
5000(1 + sex ratio)× 500. If the element of M is greater than the arrival
rates, an offer arrives; otherwise, this period the individual meet nobody.
• Initially at t=1, individuals are randomly endowed the wage drawn from
a log-normal distribution N(µ, σ). And they are assumed to be single.
• At t=2, based on the mating offer matrix M(:, 2), if mating offer arrives
and the potential partner is above the reservation value, the individual
will get married and quit the marriage market. Otherwise, the individual
remains single and wait for the next period.
• At time t, t ≥ 2, we start with probability δ that married individuals
get divorce and re-enter the marriage market. Then, the singles decide
to propose or not if meet someone. Finally, the singles quit the marriage
market if both sides agree to marry.
4. Repeat the above simulated matching process until a balanced flow is obtained:
the population that enter the marriage market equals the population that exit
the marriage market. If the stationary equilibrium (convergence) is obtained,
return the moments of single ratio for both genders. These moments are used
to match those moments from data and estimate the model.
80
Appendix C
Proof of Propositions
Here we presents the proof of proposition in the existence of equilibrium.
Proposition 1
Proof. The value function of being single as equation (1.1),
Vm(w) =
w + βλm
∫ w¯w
Rm
W (w,w′′)fw(w′′)∆w,w′′dw′′
1− β + βλm
∫ w¯w
Rm
fw(w′′)∆w,w′′dw′′
From equation (1.2), the value function of marrying women with wage w′ is
W (w,w′) =
ww′/2 + βδVm(w)
1− β(1− δ) .
Since W (w,w′) is increasing in w′, and W (·, ·), Vm(·) are continuous, the continuity
and increasing property guarantee the existence and uniqueness of w′∗ = Rm that
holds equations (1.1) and (1.2).
Proposition 3
Proof. Since the best men are always accepted, i.e., ∀w′,∆w¯m,w′ = 1 holds. we sub-
stitute the decision rule of the best men into equation (1.3),
Rm(w¯m) = 2 +
βλm
1− β(1− δ)
∫ w¯w
Rm
(w′ −Rm)fw(w′)dw′ (C.1)
here Rm is short for Rm(p¯m). By definition, we know that R
1
m = Rm(p¯m). Then
we have partial derivatives with respect to reservation value Rm for both sides of81
equation (1.3).
Left hand side of equation has lhs : = 2 > 0,
while right hand side rhs : = − βλ
1−β(1−δ)(1− Fw(Rm)) < 0,
Define
L = −Rm(w¯m) + 2 + βλm
1− β(1− δ)
∫ w¯w
Rm
(w′ −Rm)fw(w′)dw′. (C.2)
By continuity of function L, there exists an unique value of R1m = Rm(w¯m) so that
L = 0. Then the best men with w¯m are willing to propose to all the women in the
acceptance set [R1m, w¯w].
Since women with w′ ∈ [R1m, w¯w] are accepted by the best men, the rest of
men are also willing to propose to them, i.e., ∀w,∆w,w′ = 1. The reservation function
of these women is
Rw(w
′) = 2 +
βλw
1− β(1− δ)
∫ w¯m
Rw
(w −Rw)fm(w)dw (C.3)
In the special case that w′ = w¯w, by the same logic of reaching equation (5) and (6),
an unique value of R1w = Rw(w¯w) satisfies equation (7). Since the solution of equation
(7) is unique, all the women falling in [R1m, w¯w] share the same reservation value with
the best women at R1w.
Similarly, men in [R1w, w¯m] are shown to have the same reservation as the men
with w¯m. That is,
Rm(Rw(w¯w)) = 2 +
βλm
1− β(1− δ)
∫ w¯w
Rm(Rw(w¯w))
(w′ −Rm)fw(w′)dw′ (C.4)
By the uniqueness of Rm(·), hereby Rm(Rw(p¯w)) = Rw(p¯m) = R1w.
Therefore, all the men falling in [R1w, w¯m] are willing to propose to women in
the set of [R1m, w¯w] by equation (3) and ∀w ∈ [R1w, w¯m]and∀w′ ∈ [R1m, w¯w],∆w,w′ = 1.
As illustrated in figure 1.1, all the population falling in [R1m, w¯w] × [R1w, w¯m]
accept each other. They are categorized as people in Class 1.
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Proposition 4
Proof. Class 1 is defined as [R1w, R
0
w = w¯m] × [R1m, R0m = w¯w] and people in Class 1
marry each other, which is proved in proposition 4. We can reach the similar form of
other classes by backward induction. The process is shown as follows.
After excluding the people falling in class 1 from the whole population, nowa-
days the best men and women available are {w¯′m = R1w, {w¯′m = R1m}. As proved in
Proposition 4, we can define a new class by [R2w, R
1
w] × [R2m, R1m] – Class 2, where
{R2m, R2w} can be obtain from equations (5) and (7). We repeat the process of exclu-
sion and generating new classes. Finally, we stop until all the people are falling in
some class.
If one sex have one more class than the other, i.e., δn = −1 or 1, those in the
final class have no opportunity to match.
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Appendix D
Value Functions
The formulae are displayed below are the value functions for husbands under
the three other states: {both unemployed, husband employed but wife not employed,
both employed}. The definition of value function and reservation function are same
as described in the contexts.
• Both unemployed
Wm(0, 0) = um(0,0) + β{(1− λm)(1− λf )Wm(0, 0)
+(1− λm)λf [
∫
Rf (0,0)
Wm(0, w′f )dF (w
′
f ) +
∫ Rf (0,0)Wm(0, w′f )dF (w′f )]
+λm(1− λf )[
∫
Rm(0,0)
Wm(w′m, 0)dF (w
′
m) +
∫ Rm(0,0)Wm(0, 0)dF (w′f )]
+λmλf{
∫
Rf (0,0)
∫
Rm(0,w′f )
Wm(w′m, w
′
f )dF (w
′
m)dF (w
′
f )+
∫
Rf (0,0)
∫ Rm(0,w′f )Wm(0, w′f )dF (w′m)dF (w′f )
+
∫ Rf (0,0) ∫
Rm(0,0)
Wm(w′m, 0)dF (w
′
m)dF (w
′
f )+
∫ Rf (0,0) ∫ Rm(0,0)Wm(0, 0)dF (w′m)dF (w′f )]}
• Husband employed but wife not employed
Wm(wm, 0) = um(wm, 0)
+β{δm[λf (
∫
Rf (0,0)
Wm(0, w′f )dF (w
′
f ) +
∫ Rf (0,0)Wm(0, 0)dF (w′f ))
+(1− λf )Wm(0, 0)]
+(1− δm)[λf
( ∫
Rf (wm,0)
max{Wm(wm, w′f ),Wm(0, w′f )}dF (w′f )
+
∫ Rf (wm,0)max{Wm(wm, 0),Wm(0, 0)}dF (w′f )
)
+(1− λf )max{Wm(wm, 0),Wm(0, 0)}]}
• Both employed
Wm(wm, wf ) = um(wm, wf ) + β{δmδfWm(0, 0)84
+δm(1− δf )((wf ≥ Rf (0, 0))Wm(0, wf ) + (wf < Rf (0, 0))Wm(0, 0))
+(1− δm)δf max{Wm(wm, 0),Wm(0, 0)}
+(1− δm)(1− δf )((wf ≥ Rf (wm, 0))max{Wm(0, wf ),Wm(wm, wf )}
+ (wf < Rf (wm, 0))max{Wm(0, 0),Wm(wm, 0)})}
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Appendix E
Algorithm
To estimate parameters of our model, we need have the number of moments
to be equal to, or more than the dimension of parameter vector.
1. From the original sample data, calculate moments as mentioned in table 2.8.
2. For a given set of parameters, θ, and other demographic information from data
such as education levels of couples and non-labor income, we deduce a unique
set of reservation functions conditional on spousal employment status and wage
rates. Reservation function is derived from value function, which is obtained by
the fixed point methods.
3. Simulated data are generated from calculated reservation function. Individuals
from generated sample are subject to random shocks of losing jobs or receiving
wage offers. I, at the initial period, t = 1, endow couples in the simulated sample
with the same labor market conditions as they are in sample data. Then labor
market history for each household i are generated. Thus we can track their
employment status transitions across time, where i = 1, .., 1086 and t = 2, .., 36.
4. Repeating simulation Ns = 1, 000 times, I obtain simulated moments, and
therefore, distance between the simulated moments and sample moments are
calculated.
5. We search for the parameters that are constantly updated until minimum dis-
tance is received.
θSMM = argmin
θ
(ψd − ψs(θ))′WT (ψd − ψs(θ)) (E.1)
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Here, weighting matrix is initially generated by bootstrapping the sample momentsNb
times, and then the inverse of variance matrix of moments is taken, where Nb = 1, 000.
The standard errors of all the parameter estimates are calculated using the optimal
weighting matrix.
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Appendix F
Selection Criteria
The criteria that I apply to restrict data are described as below. In light of
these, if either husband or wife fails to satisfy the restrictions below, the corresponding
household is excluded.
1. Only nuclear family, which is composed of married couples.
2. Only couples who gave complete interviews. The case that only one spouse
”present” is excluded
3. Husbands aged between 25 to 50 years, and wives aged between 23-48 years at
the beginning wave (wave 1)
4. Neither in armed force now
5. No physical or mental limitation to work
6. Not currently enrolled in school, so no concerns of human capital accumulations
7. Neither receives Food Stamps or AFDC or TANF
8. Exclude families with grandparents or other relatives or disabled children
9. Exclude households whose composition changes occurred due to marriage or
divorce
10. Exclude household with a broken history. Husband and wife are required to
stay in the sample over all the waves
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Appendix G
Identification
We consider the identification issue here. We aim to recover the parameters
of wage offered arrival rate. The fraction of unemployed husbands and wives infers
arrival rate of job offer and household non-labor income. Household non-labor income
is assumed to be exogenous and provided by data. Meanwhile, arrival rates of full-time
and part-time jobs can be identified by the proportion of full-time workers compared
to that of part-time.
Hazard rate of unemployment is adopted to identify utility function. In static
model, employment status is actually labor participation. Under a dynamic model,
value of unemployment as well as of being employed can be identified by individuals’
employment transition across time. I set a monthly rate for time discount factor
β = .996 and job destruction rate δ = .004. The dynamic transition identifies the
marginal utility for working. For example, a wife may quit job when her husband
gets a good job offer; and her marginal benefit from working are offset by her value
for leisure and private consumption from the husband’s income.
Couples preferences for leisure are captured by education information from
data. It is also featured by intra-household sharing rule and their preferences of con-
sumption over leisure. The latter two, as in a standard job search model, without data
on their actual value, have to be identified by function form. And the sharing rule can
be estimated by combining percentage of no-working population and unemployment
duration.
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